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FAITH, REASON, AND BARE ANIMOSITY
DANIEL A. CRANE*

At the break of day on May 10, 1775, the great Vermonter
Ethan Allen burst into Fort Ticonderoga accompanied by a hundred of his Green Mountain Boys. Confronting a British lieutenant in a stairwell, Allen, with an ungodly string of oaths,
demanded surrender. The bewildered officer asked to know in
whose name this surrender was demanded. Drawing himself to
his full towering height, Allen roared back: "In the name of the
Great Jehovah and the Continental Congress!" Without a shot, he
captured the fort.'
The Great Jehovah may not have cared too much for Ethan
Allen. Looking upon Allen's grave with "pious horror," the Reverend Nathan Perkins characterized the general as an "awful Infidel, one of ye wickedest men yt ever walked this guilty globe."2
When Allen finally expired after a life of drunken carousing, the
president of Yale University, Ezra Stiles, noted in his diary, "Gen* Mr. Crane received his B.A. from Wheaton College and his J.D. from the
University of Chicago School of Law. He is currently an attorney with the firm of
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius.
1. This account is taken from Kenneth S. Davis, "In the Name of the Great
Jehovah and the Continental Congress," in A SENSE OF HisTORY: THE BEST
WRITING FROM THE PAGES OF AMERICAN HERITAGE 96-98 (1985); see also JoHN
PELL, ETHAN ALLEN 80-87 (1929).
2. Id. at 103.
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eral Ethan Allen of Vermont died and went to Hell this day."3 The
Calvinist fathers of Revolutionary New England doubtlessly
believed that Allen's heretical writings on Christianity and his
licentious lifestyle earned him a seat near Lucifer himself. Yet,
ironically, Allen fought under the holy mantra of "the Great Jehovah," and his pamphlet advocating a rationalistic deism4 influenced Vermont's rejection of a religious establishment. 5
Ethan Allen was neither the first nor the last American skeptical of traditional religion to enter the public sphere in the name
of God. Throughout the nation's history, God-speak has rolled off
the tongues of statesmen of all religious persuasions on all sides of
political issues. One recalls the equally adamant pulpit-pounding
by Abolitionists and Southern slave holders,6 or the opposition of
the Women's Christian Temperance Movement to the high church
denominations' tolerance of alcohol,7 or the ecclesiastical divide
over the civil rights movement in the South.' Given the diversity
of religious voices in our historical public square, it is surely fair to
say that an American's religiosity, or lack thereof, is a poor predic3. Id. at 104.
4. Id. at 100; also G.W. & A.J.

MATSELL, ETHAN ALLEN, REASON, THE ONLY
OF MAN 1836 (1784). Along with Jefferson and Paine, Allen believed
that "[r]eason must be the standard, by which we determine the respective
claims of revelation."
5. See MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, REVOLUTIONARY OuTLAws: ETHAN ALLEN AND

ORACLE

THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE ON THE EARLY AMERICAN FRONTIER

217-44

(1993).
6. For a discussion of the opposing religious views on slavery, see David A.J.
Richards, Public Reason and the Abolitionist Dissent, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 787
(1994); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 168-81
(1987); RONALD G. WALTERS, THE ANTISLAVERY APPEAL: ABOLITIONISM AFTER

1830 37-53 (1976); SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A
634-729 (1972).

RELIGIOUS

HISTORY

OF THE

AMERICAN PEOPLE

7.

JOSEPH

R.

GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC

CRUSADE:

STATUS

POLITICS AND

THE

(1963); A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN
215-17 (1985); ROBERT C. FULLER, RELIGION AND WINE,

AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT
AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE

74-95 (1996).
8. For a discussion of the role of religion in the civil rights movement, see

Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., Politics Without Brackets on Religious Convictions:
Michael Perry and Bruce Ackerman on Neutrality, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1143, 1165ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT:
BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 120-38 (1984); ADAM FAIRCLOTH,
To REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP

1175 (1990);

CONFERENCE AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR

244-50;

(1987); Reichley, supra note 7 at

ANDREw M. MANIS, SOUTHERN CIVIL RELIGIONS IN CONFLICT: BLACK AND

WHITE BAPTISTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS
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tor of her political inclinations. Every religious argument in favor
of conservatism encounters an equal and opposite religious argument supporting liberalism or radicalism. For every minister who
preaches capitalism, another teaches redistribution. From the
founding to the present, religious rhetoric has pervaded American
political debate without predetermining ultimate outcomes.
The political rhetoric of religion has not always rested easily
with the First Amendment's nonestablishment principle. 9
America, after all, has wedded itself to the causes of religious
diversity and tolerance. Theocracy begone! Increasingly in recent
years, the nonestablishment principle has been invoked in opposition to religious participation in public affairs. Most shades of this
opposition remain for now in the ivory tower. The Supreme Court,
however, has not been immune to the suggestion that religious
justifications for state action impugn the action's constitutionality.
Justices Stevens' ° and Blackmun," in particular, have explicitly2
insisted that the "secular purpose" prong of the Lemon test
requires the invalidation of statutes that do not in fact rest upon
secular justifications. At times, the Court itself has appeared to
follow suit, rejecting a state's secular justifications for statutes
9. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
11. See PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 914 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
12. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), the Supreme Court
announced a three-part test to evaluate the constitutionality of state legislation
under the establishment clause: "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion...; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive entanglement with religion.'" Although the Court has yet to abandon
Lemon formally, its failure to apply the test in recent years and specific
statements by individual justices suggest that the test may be on its deathbed.
See Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 795 (1993);
Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 865 (1993); Ira C. Lupu,
Which Old Witch? A Comment on ProfessorPaulsen'sLemon is Dead, 43 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 883 (1993); Richard S. Meyers, A Comment on the Death of Lemon,
43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903 (1993); Ronald Y. Mykkeltvedt, Souring on Lemon:
The Supreme Court'sEstablishment Clause Doctrine in Transition, 44 MERCER L.
REV. 881 (1993).
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that appeared too religious.13 Thus, although the Court's official
policy remains that the mere coincidence of a state statute with
religious dogma does not require the statute's invalidation,1 4 one
can never be quite certain when the Court will conclude that the
real reasons for a statute are religious, and that the statute therefore transgresses the nonestablishment principle.
A recent development in equal protection jurisprudence suggests that religious motivation for state action may also be subject
to attack from sources other than the Establishment Clause. In
Romer v. Evans,'5 the Supreme Court invalidated Colorado's
"Amendment 2," which prohibited the state or its subdivisions
from implementing measures protecting homosexuals from discrimination. Although many supporters of Amendment 2 relied
on religious convictions in advocating the measure, the Court
found that the amendment rested upon "animosity" and a "bare
desire to harm,"' 6 and therefore lacked a rational basis. In so
doing, the Court implicitly extended its "bare animosity"/rational
basis jurisprudence to cover religiously motivated measures disadvantaging discrete minorities.
After Romer, then, two independent constitutional principles
may limit the involvement of religion in formulating public policy.
The nonestablishment principle forbids state action that does not
in fact rest upon a secular motivation, whether or not it is clothed
in secular justification. The bare animosity principle discounts
religion as a justification for classifications imposing disabilities
on groups of individuals. Thus, the nonestablishment principle
invalidates state action because of its religious motivation, while
the naked animosity principle invalidates state action in spite of
its religious motivation.
This article critiques the convergence of the nonestablishment
and "naked animosity" principles as applied to religiously motivated state action. Part I discusses the constitutional structure of
the "bare animosity" equal protection cases and the "secular purpose" Establishment Clause cases. Part II draws parallels
13. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97 (1968); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963).
14. See Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 696
(1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
15.
U.S.
, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
16. Id. at 1628.
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between the "secular purpose" principle and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's ideal of "religious intolerance," and between the "naked animosity" principle and John Rawls's ideal of "public reason." Part
III considers how the convergence of the "no intolerance" and
"public reason" principles disenfranchises the religious voice in
society, and deprives the religiously devout of the ability to defend
their own interests in a world increasingly hostile to their values.
This article concludes by arguing that the philosophy underlying
these two principles does not support the invalidation of religiously motivated state action creating "defensive rights." In short,
this "defensive rights" model would allow state action motivated
principally by religious ideals where the state action merely
removed the threat of official sanction from private choices in the
social or economic realm.
I.
A.

THE CONVERGENCE OF

Two

CONSTITUTIONAL

LiNEs

Religious Motivation and the Establishment Clause

Over the past few years, the commentary on the role of religion in shaping public policy in a liberal democracy has been voluminous." At the same time, the Supreme Court has maintained
an official doctrine that permits religious participation in public
deliberation so long as the resulting state action does not coerce
compliance with overtly religious dogma.'" Nonetheless, reflec17. For a sampling of some of the leading books, see RONALD F. THIEMAN,
IN PUBLIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY (1996); KENT

RELIGION

GREENAWALT,
CARTER,

THE

PRIVATE

CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS

CULTURE

OF

DISBELIEF:

How

AMERICAN

(1995);
LAW

STEPHEN L.

AND

POLITICS

TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER:
THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE

(1988);

RICHARD

JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA (1984). A fairly exhaustive listing of the principal recent articles
addressing the relationship between religion and public reason appears in

Lawrence D. Solum, Novel Public Reasons, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1459, 1461 n. 7
(1996).
18. A majority of the Court has not necessarily settled on Justice Kennedy's
coercion test as a replacement for the Lemon test, if that test is, in fact, to be
replaced. See Agostini v. Felton,
U.S.
, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2015 (1997)
(continuing to pay lip service to Lemon). However, it is at least safe to say that,
after Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), a majority of the Court views coercion
as a sufficient, if not necessary, condition for a finding of an establishment clause
violation. See, generally, Paul E. Pongrace III, Justice Kennedy and the
Establishment Clause: The Supreme Court Tries the Coercion Test, 6 U. FLA. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 217 (1994); Rodney K. Smith, Conscience, Coercion and the
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tions of the growing academic debate have crept into the opinions
of individual justices, often appearing in dissenting opinions. Further, in some of the most recent establishment clause decisions,
the "strict separationist" position has appeared as part of the
Court's opinion.
1.

The Official Version: Mere Coincidence Doesn't Matter

Formally, the Supreme Court's official position remains that
state action, whether legislative or otherwise, does not violate the
establishment clause merely because that action "happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." 19 For
example, in McGowan v. Maryland,2 ° the Court held that a Sunday Blue Law's coincidence with the Christian understanding of
Sunday as a day of rest did not impugn the law's constitutionality.
Even though "the original laws which dealt with Sunday labor
were motivated by religious forces," 2 ' the State could now "conclude that the general welfare of society, wholly apart from any
religious considerations, demands such regulation."2 2 Thus, the
Decalogue's proscription of murder, theft, fraud,2" and adultery
would not prevent the state from proscribing the same through its
Establishment of Religion: The Beginning of an End to the Wandering of a
Wayward Judiciary, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917 (1993); Ronald C. Kahn, God
Save Us From the Coercion Test: Constitutive Decisionmaking,Polity Principles,
and Religious Freedom, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 983 (1993); Ralph W. Johnson,
III, Lee v. Weisman: Easy Cases Make Bad Law Too--The Direct Coercion Test is

the Appropriate Establishment Clause Standard, 2

GEO. MASON INDEP.

L.

REV.

123 (1993); Kristin J. Graham, Comment, The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle:
Coercion as the Touchstone of an Establishment Clause Violation, 42 BUFF. L.
REV. 147 (1994); Paula S. Cohen, Case Comment, Psycho-Coercion, A New
Establishment Clause Test: Lee v. Weisman and its InitialEffect, 73 B.U. L. REV.
501 (1993); Eric Fleetham, Note, Lee v. Weisman: Psychological Coercion Offends
the TraditionalNotion of Coercion under the EstablishmentClause, 24 U. TOL. L.
REV. 725 (1993); Timothy C. Caress, Case Note, Is JusticeKennedy the Supreme
Court's Lone Advocate for the Coercion Element in Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence?An Analysis of Lee v. Weisman, 27 IND. L. REV. 475 (1993); Dean
Kanellis, Lee v. Weisman: The Establishment Clause and the Element of
Coercion, 19 Omo N.U. L. REV. 317 (1992).
19. Hernandez v. Commissionerof InternalRevenue, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989),
citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
20. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
21. Id. at 431.
22. Id. at 442.
23. Presumably, the Court meant to refer to the Ninth Commandment's
prohibition on giving false testimony. Exodus 21:16.
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and its companion case" thus make clear
civil laws.2 4 McGowan
that the mere fact that a statute could be, and historically has
been, supported by religious justifications does not mean that the
statute establishes a religion, so long as it can be independently
supported by secular justifications.
Similarly, in Harris v. McRae ,26 the Court rejected the argument that the Hyde Amendment,2 7 prohibiting the expenditure of
federal Medicaid funds for the performance of most abortions,
"violate[d] the Establishment Clause because it incorporate[d]
into law the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church concerning
the sinfulness of abortion and the time at which life commences." 28 Finding that the Hyde Amendment reflect[d] "traditionalist" values toward abortion as much as the views of any
particular religion, the Court had no difficulty holding that this
case, like McGowan, represented nothing more than a coincidence
of public choice with religious preference. 29 The fact that Congressman Henry Hyde, the amendment's sponsor and a staunch
Roman Catholic, undoubtedly harbored religious, as opposed to
merely "traditionalist," reasons for opposing abortion would not
damn the amendment.
Since Harris,the Court has reaffirmed the "mere coincidence"
principle on several occasions.3 0 Officially, then, the story
remains that the state may exercise its coercive power in ways
approved by particular religions, so long as it offers religion-neutral and otherwise permissible reasons for a particular exercise of
its power.

2.

The Other Version: FerretingOut Religious Motivation

Despite the "mere coincidence" principle of McGowan and its
progeny, individual justices, and the Court itself on some occasions, have taken the position that an act of the state that embod24. 366 U.S. at 442.
25. Gallagherv.Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
The Blue Law in statute still contained references to "the Lord's Day" and spoke
of weekdays as "secular days," but the Court dismissed this "objectionable
language [as] merely a relic." Id. at 627.
26. 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980).

27. Pub. L. No. 94-439, Title II, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976), codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1980).
28. 448 U.S. at 319.
29. Id. at 319-20.
30. See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 696; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 682
(1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n. 30 (1983).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
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ies a predominantly religious viewpoint, although not stated in
religious terms, 3 violates the Establishment Clause.3 2 Justice
Stevens, in particular, has voted to invalidate legislative acts
because of their overly cozy fit with religious dogma. In Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs. ,33 Stevens dissented from the plurality's refusal to invalidate the preamble to a Missouri statute
declaring that life begins at conception and that conception occurs
at fertilization.3 4 In Stevens's view, although the preamble made
no overtly religious reference, it "reflect[ed] nothing more than a
difference in theological doctrine."3 5 Thus, it lacked an identifiable secular purpose in contravention of the first prong of the
Lemon test.3 6 Stevens has made a similar statement in at least
one other abortion case, 3 7 and persuaded Justice Blackmun to follow suit on another occasion.3 8 Similarly, in Bowers v. Hardwick ,39 Blackmun dissented from the majority's refusal to ground
a right to engage in homosexual sodomy in the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause, arguing that the state could not
consistent with the Establishment Clause rely on theological justi-

31. A distinction can be drawn between acts of the state that support
identifiable religious trappings-for example religious decorations on public
property, prayer in public schools, or aid to religious institutions-and public
policy positions that may be motivated exclusively by religious considerations
but which are facially non-religious.
32. A similar line of reasoning has occasionally surfaced in the lower courts as
well. One well-known example is a Western District of Missouri Judge's
invalidation of a school district's policy restricting dancing on s'cliool premises.
Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850 (W.D. Mo. 1988). Judge Clark relied, inter
alia, on an hour-long Sunday School discussion of the dancing issue by one the
school board's members in concluding that the policy was "inherently religious,"
and thus violative of the Lemon test. Id. at 854-55. The Eighth Circuit reversed,
noting that "this approach to constitutional analysis would have the effect of
disenfranchising religious groups when they succeed in influencing secular
decisions." Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 380 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081
(1990).
33. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
34. Id. at 566.
35. Id. at 568.
36. Id. at 566-67.
37. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetriciansand Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
38. PlannedParenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
914 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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fications to support the anti-sodomy statute.4 0 To Blackmun, the
statute amounted to an act of "religious intolerance.
What is distinctive about the position of Justices Stevens and
Blackmun is that it insists on ferreting beyond a statute's religionneutral facade to root out illegitimate religious motivation. In the
typical Establishment Clause case, say one involving school
prayer or state aid to parochial schools, the religious element
appears on the face of the classification itself. By contrast, regulations of abortion or sodomy are not facially religious, and could be
motivated by any number of nonreligious attitudes, ranging from
populationism to bare (but nonreligious) animosity. The Stevens/
Blackmun view of the Establishment Clause holds that the Court
should strike down any legislative classification that does not in
fact rest upon a non-theological justification, whether or not the
classification could be independently justified. In several cases, a
majority of the Court has undertaken actual basis review in
Establishment Clause cases, although never quite saying as
much.
For example, in Epperson v. Arkansas,4 2 the Court held that
Arkansas's "monkey law," forbidding the teaching of evolution in
the public schools, violated the Establishment Clause by enshrining "fundamentalist sectarian conviction" in state law.4 3 Facially,
the statute said absolutely nothing about religion, whereas its
undoubted inspiration, the Tennessee statute at issue in the
famous Scopes trial, did.4 Nonetheless, the Court noted that
"[n]o suggestion has been made that Arkansas' law may be justified by considerations of state policy other than the religious views
of some of its citizens."4 5 In support of this proposition, the Court
relied on a pro-monkey law advertisement with an explicitly reli-

40. Id. at 211-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 212.
42. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
43. Id. at 108.
44. The Court noted that the Tennessee statute "candidly stated its purpose:
to make it unlawful 'to teach any theory that denies the story of Divine Creation
of man has taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has descended
from a lower order of animals." Id. at 108-09. The Tennessee Supreme Court
upheld the Tennessee statute, Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (1927), but reversed
Scopes conviction on the ground that the jury, and not the judge, should have
assessed the $100 fine.
45. 393 U.S. at 107.
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gious appeal printed in the Arkansas Gazette. 46 Thus, despite the
state's effort to eliminate the explicitly religious language in the
statute itself that would surely have doomed the statute at issue
in Scopes, the Court had "no doubt that the motivation for the law
was the same: to suppress the teaching of a theory which, it was
4
thought, 'denied' the divine creation of man." 1
The Court took its "actual basis" Establishment Clause
review to an even higher level, in Edwards v. Aguillard,48 where
the state vigorously denied that any religious motivation for its
law requiring the teaching of "creation science" to accompany the
teaching of evolution in the public schools. Although the Court
noted that it would normally defer to the state's articulation of a
secular purpose, "it is required that the statement of such purpose
be sincere and not a sham."4 9 As in Epperson, the Court relied on
the statute's legislative history, there the statements of the bill's
sponsor, to locate an invidious religious motivation underlying the
statute.5 ° Similarly, in Wallace v. Jaffree,5 ' Stone v. Graham,5 2
and School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Court
rejected the states' religion-neutral justifications for various semireligious accouterments of public education, finding in each
instance that the true motivation for the relevant state action was
religious.
These cases exhibit a range of possible attitudes toward the
propriety of religious motivations in the formation of public policy.
For purposes of convenience, these can be broken down into three
possible positions. First, religious motivations for a statute may
not require its invalidation if the statute itself does not coerce con46. Id. at 108 n. 16. The advertisement provided as follows: "THE BIBLE OR
ATHEISM, WHICH? All atheists favor evolution. If you agree with atheism vote
against Act No. 1. If you agree with the Bible vote for Act No. 1.... Shall
conscientious church members be forced to pay taxes to support teachers to teach
evolution which will undermine the faith of their children? The Gazette said
Russian Bolshevists laughed at Tennessee. True, and that sort will laugh at
Arkansas. Who cares? Vote FOR ACT NO. 1." THE ARKANsAS GAZETTE, LrTTE
ROCK, Nov. 4, 1928, p. 12, cols. 4-5.
47. 393 U.S. at 109.
48. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
49. Id. at 586-87.
50. Id. at 587, citing statement of Senator Bill Keith.
51. 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating public school requirement of moment of
silence for prayer or meditation).
52. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (invalidating posting of Ten Commandments on public
school classroom wall).
53. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating daily Bible readings in public school).
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formity or nonconformity with religious dogma. Second, a statute
supported by some religious considerations may not be invalid so
long as it can be independently supported by nonreligious considerations, whether or not such considerations motivated the legislature or voters. Finally, any statute that in fact rests primarily
on a religious justification may be presumptively invalid, whether
or not it coerces conformity with religious dogma or could be supported by independent secular considerations. This article will
refer to this third possibilities as the "strict separationist"
position.5 4
A majority of the Court has yet to adopt the strict separationist position as such. In all of the cases in which the Court has
relied solely on Lemon's "purpose prong" to invalidate state action,
the state action itself could not be understood without reference to
religion. School prayers, "creation science," and the Ten Commandments are arguably facially religious products of religiously
informed preferences. By contrast, restrictions on abortion and
homosexuality, the paradigmatic evils in the Stevens/Blackmun
model, make no explicit religious reference. That a majority of the
Court has yet to join the strict separationist position suggests an
implicit acceptance of the distinction between facially religious
acts supported by religious justifications and acts that are not
facially religious but which are nonetheless religiously motivated.
But if the distinction continues to hold in the Establishment
Clause context, in a nonobvious way it may have lost its grip in
the equal protection context, to which we now turn.
B.

"BareAnimosity" Rational Basis Review

Rational basis review under the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment's due process clause, now its identical twin,5 5
54. I have chosen the "strict separationist" label at some peril, because the
phrase is often used to denote a variety of different understandings of the
Establishment Clause. However, I think it best encapsulates the modern
secularist viewpoint that religion should play no overt or covert role in the
formation of public policy. See ARLIN M. ADAms AND CHARLEs J. EMMERICH, A
NATION DEDICATED To RELIGIOUs LIBERTY 53 (1990) (describing strict
separationist position).
55. In order to avoid the embarrassment of ordering Topeka's public schools
desegregated while permitting the District of Columbia's schools to remain
segregated, the Supreme Court found an equal protection component in the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Bolling v.Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
In Adarand v. Pena,
U.S.
, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2100-01 (1995), the Court
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consists in fact of two very different sorts of review. The first version-let us call it conventional rational basis review-has been
invoked hundreds of times since the "Switch in Time that Saved
Nine" in 1937,56 and even occasionally before that time.5 7 The second version-bare animosity rational basis review-did not
emerge until the 1970s 58 and has only been used by the Supreme
Court a handful of times since then.5 9
1.

Conventional Rational Basis Review

Conventional rational basis review is the offspring of the
Carolene Products6" recreation of the constitutional universe.
What began as a mere musing in a footnote by Justice Stone,6 '
soon became "[tihe great and modem charter for ordering the relaconfirmed that the Fifth Amendment equal protection component is coextensive
with the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.
56. According to popular wisdom, Justice Robert's switching of sides in West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) saved the Court from Franklin
Roosevelt's court-packing plan. Although the accuracy of this perception is
subject to considerable doubt, See DAVID P. CURRiE, Tm CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 236 (1990), the year 1937
unquestionably marked a sharp change in the Supreme Court's habit of striking
down New Deal legislation as exceeding the federal commerce power, or violating
the due process or equal protection clauses.
57. As early as 1934, the Court had rejected a substantive due process and
equal protection challenge to State-established price controls, holding that the
only unconstitutional economic regulations are those "arbitrary, discriminatory,
or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy of the Legislature." See Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934). Full blown rational basis review, however, did
not emerge until the troika of anti-New Deal constitutional tools-narrow
construction of Congress' enumerated powers, equal protection, and substantive
due process-came crashing down in 1937. The phrase "rational basis" first
appeared in a Supreme Court opinion in 1944, in Stage Stores Co. v. Kansas, 323
U.S. 32, 35 (1944).
58. The bare animosity version first appeared in United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
59. See, Romer v. Evans, U.S. , 116 S Ct. 1620 (1996); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982);
United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
60. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
61. According to Justice Powell, by footnote 4 Justice Stone meant only to
"spark debate over ideas that he had not developed fully" and not to outline "a
comprehensive theory of constitutional adjudication.") Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (1982), citing
ALPHEUS MASON, HARLAN FIsKE STONE: PnLLAR OF THE LAw 513 (1956).
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tions between judges and other agencies of government." 62 In the
Carolene Products dispensation, state regulations in the social
and economic realm would only need to meet the test of broadly
defined rationality, absent some conflict with a specific prohibition
of the Bill of Rights or the manifestation of prejudice against the
rights of "discrete and insular minorities."63 The two-tiered formulation of Carolone Products has since been flushed out to add
further layers of scrutiny (exactly how many is the subject of some
debate), 64 but rational basis review clearly remains the bottom
floor. Unless a legislative classification burdens a fundamental
right, or draws lines on the basis of race, national origin, citizenship, sex, or legitimacy of birth, rational basis review applies.6"
As a tool for examining the fit between means and ends, the
rational basis standard has been particularly lax. The mere fact
that in pursuing a legitimate end, a legislative classification treats
people differently in the social or economic sphere will rarely, if
ever, be sufficient to state a claim under the equal protection
clause. Justice Douglas's classic formulation of the standard
leaves wide discretion to the state in fitting means to ends:
The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one,
admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may
be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different
remedies. Or so the legislature may think. [citation omitted]. Or
the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the
phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative
62. Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 6 (1979). See also Lea Brilmayer, Carolene,
Conflicts, and the Fate of the Inside-Outsider," 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1291
(1986) (Carolene Products is no longer just a case, but instead "a line of
reasoning, and one so venerable as to have achieved almost axiomatic status in a
world where virtually every other proposition of Constitutional law is best
considered controversial.").
63. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n. 4 ("There may be a narrower scope
of operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the
first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.").
64. Until recently, classifications on the basis of gender and legitimacy
seemed to occupy an intermediate scrutiny floor. The Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996), invalidating Virginia's
maintenance of the single-sex Virginia Military Institution, leaves in some doubt
the level of scrutiny as to gender classifications.
65. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITurIoNAL LAw § 14.3
at 608 (5th ed. 1995)
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mind. [citation omitted]. The legislature may select one phase of
one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. [citation
omitted]. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no
further than invidious discrimination."
Except for the "bare animosity" cases discussed below, the
Supreme Court has generally upheld state classifications when
rational basis review has applied to equal protection challenges.6"
Increasingly in the last three decades, however the Court has
begun to use the rational basis test as a tool for ferreting out not
only poor fits between means and ends, but legislative classifications motivated by illegitimate purposes. 6 s The "legitimate purpose" prong of rational basis review now appears to have sharper
66. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
67. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) (upholding state
classification distinguishing between mentally retarded and mentally ill); Reno v.
Flores,
U.S.
, 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993) (upholding Immigration and
Nationalization Service regulations denying release from government child
awaiting deportation unless child could be released into care of relative); Dallas
v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989) (upholding municipal ordinance limiting use of
dance halls to persons between ages of 14 and 18); Pennell v. City of San Jose,
485 U.S. 1 (1988) (upholding rent control ordinance); Bowen v. Gilliard,483 U.S.
587 (1987) (upholding Aid to Families With Dependent Children classification
which reduced aid to extended families living in single home); Lyng v. Castillo,
477 U.S. 635 (1986) (upholding food stamp classification disadvantaging nuclear
families); Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 (1986) (upholding Social Security
classification treating more favorably widowed spouses who remarried before
sixty than those who remarried after sixty); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314
(1981) (upholding selective federal mining restrictions); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450
U.S. 221 (1981) (upholding Social Security Act classification reducing Medicaid
benefits to persons institutionalized in mental health facilities); Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (upholding state's ban on retail
sale of milk in plastic containers when state permitted sale of milk in paperboard
containers); United States R.R. . Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980)
(upholding federal pension plan eliminating dual benefits for non-retired railroad
workers while retaining them for retired workers); New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (upholding transit authority's refusal to
employ persons who use narcotic drug methadone); Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (upholding 50 year old retirement
provision for state police force); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949) (upholding regulation prohibiting operation of advertising vehicles
but permitting business notices upon business delivery vehicles); Kotch v. Board
of River Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (upholding against
nepotism charges state requirement that harbor pilots complete apprenticeship
before licensing).
68. D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government Purposes and State Enforcement of
Morality, 1993 U. IuL. L. REV. 67, 83-84 (1993) (Noting that traditional rational
basis review referred to the purpose of statutes without mentioning legitimacy,
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teeth than the means/ends prong. The problems this inquiry
raises, however, have proven significantly more challenging than
the comparatively easier task of judging the fit between means
and ends.
2.

Bare Animosity Review

When the Supreme Court has invalidated state or federal
classifications under the rational basis standard, it has often done
so on the basis of the classification's illegitimate purpose. But
how does the Court know an illegitimate purpose when it sees
one? 6 9 The Constitution contains no canon of impermissible purposes, or, for that matter, permissible ones. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has flirted on again off again with making purpose
relevant in reviewing the constitutionality of legislative or executive action.7 0 For purposes of equal protection review, it is now
firmly established that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to
be discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."71
In the arena of rational basis review, illegitimate purpose (as
opposed to failure of means/ends rationality) may be subdivided
into two categories. At a high level of generality, both categories
involve the state's decision to allocate burdens or benefits on the
basis of what Cass Sunstein has labeled "naked preferences."7 2
The state reveals its naked preferences when it distributes
"resources or opportunities to one group rather than another
solely on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw
political power to obtain what they want."7 3 Although nominally
using equal protection rational basis review to root out all state
legislation based on naked preferences, the Supreme Court has in
and that inquiry into the legitimacy of legislative purpose did not begin until the
1970s).
69. One might also ask how the Court even knows what the purpose of a
statute is. Public choice theory has quite compellingly argued that legislatures
do not act according to collective purposes. See, e.g., William N. Eskeridge, Jr. &
Phillip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal
Process Era, 48 U. PiTT. L. REV. 691, 702-03 (1987).
70, See Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection
RationalityReview, 37 Via. L. REV. 1, 20-22 (1992).
71. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
72. Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1689 (1984).

73. Id. at 1689.
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fact developed two separate standards of naked preference
rational basis review.
The first category of impermissible purposes consists of state
preferences for one group over another in the allocation of scarce
resources. The Supreme Court has used this variant of naked
preference review, for example, to prohibit state preferences for
domestic industry over foreign industry14 and discriminatory taxation schemes against those who purchase automobiles out of
state.7 5 These cases usually involve discriminatory treatment of
out-of-state interests, and therefore overlap with the Court's privileges and immunities clause7 6 and negative commerce clause
jurisprudence. What distinguishes these cases from the bare animosity cases discussed below is that the discriminatory state classifications are not usually motivated by a desire to harm an
unpopular minority. Rather they are meant to favor politically
powerful interests within the state at the expense of groups
unrepresented in the political process. Thus, these cases reflect a
representation-reinforcement model of equal protection review. 7
Rewarding the well-represented at the expense of the unrepresented may be the course of business as usual, but it is not
rational in a constitutionally salient sense.7 5
In a second and distinct line of cases, the Supreme Court has
invalidated legislative classifications that the Court has perceived
to be motivated by nothing but naked animosity toward a particular group of people. Of course, if the state expressed animosity
toward a suspect or quasi-suspect class, say a racial or ethnic
minority, the classification would violate the equal protection
74. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
75. Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985). See also, Hooper v. Bernalillo
County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985) (state may not reward "its own" by favoring
Vietnam veterans who previously resided in state over those who did not); Zobel
v. Alaska, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (rewarding past contributions to state is not a
legitimate state purpose).
76. The privileges and immunities clause strand of this troika only applies
when the plaintiff is a natural person. See Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239
(1898) (corporation is not protected under Article IV, section 2's privileges and
immunities clause).
77. For a discussion of the representation-reinforcement theory, see JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDicIAL REVIEW 73-104
(1980). For a general discussion of the role of judicial review in controlling state
discrimination against foreigners, see Matthew Adler, What States Owe
Outsiders, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391 (1992).
78. On the other hand, if one's object is reelection, pork barreling is not only
rational, but indispensable.
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clause virtually per se. In each of the bare animosity cases, however, the Court has refrained, either explicitly or implicitly, from
making the relevant class suspect or quasi-suspect, relying
instead on the proposition that regardless of the nature of the
class, the state behaves irrationally when it singles out a group of
people for adverse treatment simply because it doesn't like them.
In the earliest bare animosity case, United States Dept. of
Agriculture v. Moreno,7 9 the Supreme Court invalidated an
amendment to the federal Food Stamp Act of 196480 that excluded
from participation in the food stamp program any household containing an individual who was unrelated to any other member of
the household. Although the Government argued that its interest
in minimizing fraud underlay the statute," l Justice Brennan dug
into the legislative history and discovered that the relevant
amendment "was intended to prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hip8 2
pie communes' from participating in the food stamp program."
This latent government interest could not sustain the amendment. "[I]f the constitutional conception of'equal protection of the
laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
"considerconstitute a legitimate governmental interest."8 3 Some
4
ation[] in the public interest" would be required.
The Supreme Court took up the bare animosity mantra again
in Plyler v. Doe,8 5 where it held that a Texas statute prohibiting
the children of illegal immigrants to attend the public schools violated the equal protection clause. Although the precise standard
of review employed in Plyler remains subject to some debate,8 6 the
underlying theme of the opinion is that it is "illogical and unjust"
to punish the children of illegal immigrants for the sins of their
79. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
80. 7 U.S.C. § 2012 (e), as amended 84 Stat. 2048.
81. 413 U.S. at 536.
82. Id. at 534.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 535.
85. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
86. See Linda E. Carter, Intermediate Scrutiny Under Fire: Will Plyler
Survive State Legislation to Exclude Undocumented Children from School?, 31
U.S.F. L. REV. 345 (1997); Rebecca E. Greenlee, Equal ProtectionAnalysis Grows
Stronger: Plyler v. Doe, 17 REV. JuR. U.I.P.R. 335 (1983); Tom Gerety, Children
in the Labyrinth: The Complexities of Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 379
(1983); Elizabeth Hull, Undocumented Alien Children and Free Public
Education:An Analysis of Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 409 (1983).
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parents.8 7 Rejecting the State's litany of proffered justifications,
the Court insisted that the State "do more than justify its classifi88
cation with a concise expression of an intention to discriminate."
In other words, a mere dislike of the presence of illegal aliens
within the borders of the United States would not justify the visitation of punishment upon their innocent children.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 9 afforded the
Court with another opportunity to voice its disapproval of classifications based on bare animosity. There, the Court held that a
city's denial of a special use permit for the operation of a group
home for the mentally retarded could not survive rational basis
scrutiny. As in the prior bare animosity cases, the city offered various justifications for the denial, which the Court in turn rejected,
finding that the real basis for the city's actions was "negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding."9" Basing the denial of the special
use permit on such "private biases" would amount to an irrational
discrimination against a non-suspect class in violation of the
equal protection clause. 9 1
With the bare animosity principle firmly established, the
Court undertook a much grander project in Romer. The countermajoritarian difficulty identified by Alexander Bickel is palpable
enough when the Court invalidates ordinary legislation enacted in
the usual course of business.9 2 When the Court invalidates a state
constitutional amendment enacted by popular referendum after
full and heated political deliberation, and in the process accuses
53% of the state's electorate of bare animosity and irrationality,
the counter-majoritarian difficulty reaches its zenith. Nonetheless, in Romer the Court undertook to apply its rare breed of bare
animosity rational basis review to a popularly ratified state-wide
referendum, and, in so doing, took bare animosity review to a new
level.
87. 457 U.S. at 220, citing Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175 (1972).
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 227.
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
Id. at 448.
Id., citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
92. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16, 16-23 (1962) ("The root difficulty is that
judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our [democratic] system.").
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Due to the high profile of the case, the facts of Romer are generally well known.9 3 Responding to anti-discrimination measures
enacted by the cities of Aspen and Boulder and the City and
County of Denver, Colorado's voters adopted "Amendment 2" in a
1992 statewide referendum.9 4 Amendment 2 amended the Colorado constitution to prohibit the State of Colorado and any of its
political subdivisions to "adopt or enforce any statute, regulation,
ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons
to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected
status or claim of discrimination." 95 In the Supreme Court, the
plaintiffs 6 argued that Amendment 2 violated the equal protection clause by arbitrarily erecting barriers to the rights of gays,
lesbians, and bi-sexuals to seek protected status through the political process. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the
Court agreed.97
Placing Romer within any particular tradition of constitutional doctrine is somewhat of a challenge, as evidenced by the
fact that even those sympathetic to its result have been writing
furiously ever since the opinion's arrival to remold it into a more
coherent structure. 98 I do not attempt here to critique the decision
93. For a comprehensive history of Amendment 2, see Michael J. Gallagher,
Amendment 2, 4 LAw & SEX. 123 (1994).
94. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
95. Colo. Const. Art. II, § 30b.
96. The plaintiffs were homosexual individuals, a school district, and various
cities and counties. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), affd, U.S.
116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
97. Although the Court declined explicitly to follow the "discriminatory
structuring of government" path taken by the Colorado Supreme Court, 116 S.
Ct. at 1624, it is impossible to understand Romer without some reference to the
discriminatory structuring principle. See Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No.
1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 36 (1967). As everyone
concedes, if the voters of Boulder, Aspen, and Denver could repeal their gayrights ordinances, then surely the voters of Colorado as a whole could accomplish
the same end. See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's
Rightness, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 203, 206 (1996). The understood difference between
repeal and structural amendment (of which Justice Scalia so bitterly complains)
must therefore account for something in the Court's opinion. See Coalition for
Economic Equality v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1441 (9th Cir. 1997) (characterizing
Romer as a "political structure" case).
98. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Gay Rights and the Courts: The Amendment 2
Controversy, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 387, 388 (1997) (arguing that "the [Romer]
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in a comprehensive sense. For present purposes, it is enough to
note that the majority opinion rests at least in part on the bare
animosity principle of Moreno and its progeny. After explaining
the effect of Amendment 2 in Section II of his opinion, Justice
Kennedy turns in Section III to an explanation of how the amendment fails rational basis review under the equal protection clause.
He first tells us that "[i]t is not within our constitutional tradition
to enact laws" that "identifly] persons by a single trait and then
den[y] them protection across the board."9 9 Such a law is both
overly narrow in identifying a person by a single trait, and overly
broad in denying him or her protection across the board. 10 0 Kennedy appeals to the text of the Fourteenth Amendment: "A law
declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of
citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is a
denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense."' 0 '
Thus, the state cannot be protecting its citizens equally when it
prohibits some of them, but not all of them, to seek the protection
of the laws.
Kennedy then moves beyond the literal "equal protection"
argument to condemn Amendment 2 on a second ground. "A second and related point is that laws of the kind now before us raise
the inevitable inference that the disadvantaged imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected. 10° 2 Moreno promajority reached the right result, but for reasons that it articulated only
partially or not at all"); Amar, supra note 98 (advancing an Attainder Clause
justification for Romer's result); Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah
Principle, 13 CONsT. CoMMENTARY 257 (1996) (supporting Romer under
constitutional "pariah principle"); Thomas B. Wolff, Case Note, Principled
Silence, 106 YALE L. J. 247 (1996) (defending Romer as subtle first step on road
to elevated scrutiny for sexual orientation).
99. 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
100. Id. Curiously, Justice Kennedy sees no conflict between this principle and
numerous legislative classifications that define a class by a single trait and then
deprive its members of a broad panorama of legal entitlements. For example,
although Kennedy believes that the principle of Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S.
24 (1974) "is not implicated by our decision and is unexceptionable," felons are
unquestionably identified by a single trait (the commission of a felony) and are
denied a whole host of legal entitlements, such as the right to vote, the right to
own a firearm, and the right to hold public office. Kennedy may see a difference
here if he understands felons to be identified by a trait of conduct and gays,
lesbians, and bi-sexuals to be identified by a trait of personality, but the broad
principle he states makes no such differentiation.
101. 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
102. Id.
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vides support for this proposition: "[A] bare ... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."1 0 3 Kennedy distinguishes Amendment 2 from
laws that further legitimate public policies and only incidentally
burden discrete groups of persons. 10 4 "Amendment 2 ... in making a general announcement that gays and lesbians shall not have
any particular protections from the law, inflicts on them immedibelie any legitiate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and
1 °5
mate justifications that may be claimed for it.
So there we have it. Whatever the state may try to argue, the
Court knows that Amendment 2 isn't really about respecting freedom of association or religion, or preserving scarce legal resources
on the anti-discrimination front, or in achieving statewide uniformity and deterring factionalism.1 0 6 The Court can smell a rat,
and an malodorous one at that. The amendment does not serve
any legitimate public purpose. Rather, it was "born of animosity"
and founded on "a bare desire to harm" gays, lesbians, and bi-sexuals. In short, it violates the constitutional naked animosity
principle.
Romer breaks no new ground in announcing that the state
may not single out a class of persons for unfavorable treatment
simply because it doesn't like them. As discussed above, this
equal protection principle saw fruit in at least three earlier cases.
What is new about Romer is that the arguments advanced in
favor of the legislative classification were not nakedly hostile to
gays, lesbians, and bi-sexuals in the same way that the arguments
against "hippie communes" were nakedly expressed in Moreno, or
the naked fears of the mentally handicapped were implicit
(though unexpressed) in Cleburne.107 Rather, the citizens of Colorado clothed their support (and opposition) to Amendment 2 in the
103. Id., citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The State argued all of these things in its appellate briefs. Appellant's
Opening Brief at 41-47, 1995 WL 310026.
107. Apparently, naked animosity rational basis review is unaffected by
whether the illegitimate purpose to harm is explicitly expressed in the legislative
classification itself (which it never is), is explicitly expressed by the
classification's supporters (as in Romer and Moreno), or is never overtly
expressed, but is nonetheless implicit in the classification (as in Cleburne and
Plyler). The Court apparently feels free to infer naked animus from either
legislative statement, legislative history, or legislative effect.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999

21

Campbell
Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 1
CAMPBELL LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 21:125

lofty language of morality, political theory, and economics. And,
above all, they clothed their arguments in the language of religion.
3.

The Role of Religion in Romer

Standing "at the window of his high-ceilinged chambers, waiting to go on the bench, looking down at the crowd of competing
protestors in the plaza below,"' 01 Justice Kennedy must have
been aware of the religious subtext of the controversy over
Amendment 2. The popular media billed the referendum as a
showdown between the "religious right" and the gay rights movement. 10 9 Although Colorado for Family Values, the amendment's
principal sponsor, vigorously resisted being labeled as a group
composed solely of religious conservatives, 1 0 numerous religious
organizations campaigned in favor of Amendment 2.11 More
often than not, the amendment's supporters couched their arguments in explicitly religious language, relying principally on Biblical passages condemning homosexuality. 1 1 2 Charged with
108. This is how Terry Carter, a writer for California Lawyer, described
Justice Kennedy the morning the Court handed down its decision in Casey, as
quoted in Jeffrey Rosen, Annals of Law: The Agonizer, THE NEW YORKER, Nov.
11, 1996 at 82, 87.
109. See, e.g., Robert Phil F. Nagel, Rule of the Supreme Court's Bad
Language, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 17, 1993 at A15; Reeves, To Ski or Not to
Ski: That is the Stars' Question Whether 'Tis Nobler in Hollywood's Mind to
Support Gays or Head for Aspen's Slopes, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 17, 1992 at B10;
William F. Woo, Drawing a Circle Around All of Us, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH,
November 29, 1992 at 1B; Amendment 2 Sparks Talk of Boycotts, COLORADO
SPRINGS GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, Nov. 7, 1992 at B1; D'Arcy Fallon, Amendment 2
Seen as Giving Green Light to Discrimination/Groups Protestat Car Dealership,
COLORADO SPRINGS GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, Oct. 27, 1992 at B1; Michael Booth,
Gay-RightsAmendment Fight Costly, Heated, DENVER POST, Oct. 19, 1992 at 4B;
Michael Booth, Colorado Gay-Rights Battlefield, DENVER POST, September 27,
1992 at 1A.
110. See Angela Dire, God, Gays, and the Law/Anti-Gay Rights Issue Prompt
Unusual Debate, COLORADO SPRINGS GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, Oct. 18, 1992 at Al
(citing statements by leaders of Colorado for Family Values identifying support
for Amendment 2 by former Colorado Civil Rights Commission chairmen and
minority leaders).
111. Bill Manson, Anti-Gay Cowboys in Colorado Face Shoot-Out with
Hollywood, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 27, 1992 at Fll.
112. See, e.g., Dire, God, Gays, and the Law, supra note 111 at Al (citing
comment of Colorado Springs mailroom clerk Mark Williams: "I base what I feel
totally on the word of God . . . And the word of God definitely speaks against
homosexuality."); Booth, Colorado Gay-Rights Battlefield, supra note 110 at 1A
(citing comment of Rev. Woodie Stevens, pastor of First Church of the Nazarene
in Colorado Springs in support of Amendment 2: "The traditional values of this
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improperly introducing religious dogma into public debate, leaders of the pro-Amendment 2 movement remained unfazed. Kevin
Tebedo, son of a Republican state representative and one of Colorado for Family Value's organizers, offered the following candid
rebuttal: "You see, we say we should have the separation of church
and state, but you see, Jesus Christ is the king of kings and the
lord of lords. That is politics; that is rule; that is authority. So
1 13
whose authority is going to rule?"
This sort of theocratic admission, of course, is just what it
takes to fan the flames of the "culture war" into white heat. The
religious consensus, however, was by no means monolithic. In the
battle over Amendment 2, religious rhetoric played a dominant
role on both sides of the issue. As one newspaper account noted,
"[clhurch groups are sharply divided over Amendment 2 ... but
the most vocal religious organizations are those opposing the measure." 1 4 Many Christian and Jewish religious groups vocally
opposed the measure." 5 Public argument over Amendment 2
often took a bizarre form as supporters relied on the Biblical condemnation of homosexuality and the demise of Sodom and Gomorrah and opponents countered with examples of the compassion
and inclusivity of Jesus." 6 The debate flowed with Sunday School
rhetoric, but, alas, without Sunday School manners.
The State wisely avoided any mention of this religious outburst in its appeal to the Supreme Court. In its opening brief, the
State offered three justifications for Amendment 2-(1) that it
maintains the integrity of civil rights laws; (2) that it enhances
individual freedoms; and (3) that it achieves statewide uniformity
and deters factionalism. "' Only the second of these touched at all
nation have been the Judeo-Christian heritage, basically the Ten
Commandments.").
113. Booth, Colorado Gay-Rights Battlefield, supra note 110 at 1A.
114. Virginia Culver, Gay-Rights Amendment is Dividing Church Groups,
DENVER POST, Sept. 28, 1992 at 1A; see also Steve Rabey, Clergymen Differ Over
Role in Tackling Election Issues, COLORADO SPRINGS GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, Oct.
31, 1992 at E3; Anne Windishar, Gay Rights Pit Pastor Against Pastor,
COLORADO SPRINGS GAZETTE TELEGRAPH, June 22, 1992 at Al.
115. Booth, Colorado Gay-Rights Battlefield, supra note 110 at 1A.
116. See Dire, God, Gays and the Law, supra note 111 at Al for a vivid recital
of some of the "for and against" religious rhetoric; see also Steven A. Delchin,
Scalia 18:22: Thou Shall Not Lie with the Academic and Law School Elite; it is
an Abomination, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 207, 242-43 (1996) (discussing role of
religious belief in passage of Amendment 2).
117. Appellant's Opening Brief at 41-47, 1995 WL 310026.
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on a religious theme, and even there the State stayed away from
any mention of the religious rhetoric that had permeated Colorado
in the Fall of 1992. Arguing that Amendment 2 secured religious
liberty and freedom of association, the Attorney General carefully
eschewed any attempt to justify the measure as an expression of
public moral sentiment founded upon religious conviction.
Instead, she focused on the invasive impact that anti-gay discrimination ordinances could have on religious associations, such as
churches, and private religious individuals. The brief thus portrayed Amendment 2 as a shield of religious liberty rather than as
a sword of the religious right.
Thousands of miles away in Washington, the six members of
the majority could easily compare the State's sweetened version
with the raw reports from the trenches and choose to cut through
the sugar-coating. At its heart, the battle over Amendment 2 was
ground zero in the emergent culture war between religious conservatives and social progressives. 118 As the Court surely saw it,
the winning side, the religious conservatives, appropriated the
coercive power of the state to inflict harm on a discrete group of
people, and for no better reason that the religious conservatives
didn't like gays and lesbians. To Justice Kennedy and the five
supporting justices, this amounted to nothing less than naked hostility-and naked hostility of a religious nature at that.1 19 The
lesson of Romer, then, is that the state may not impose disabilities
on a discrete group of persons merely because it disapproves of
them (or their conduct) for religious reasons. Religious disapproval, in short, does not count as a legitimate public purpose for a
law.
How far this equation of religious disapproval with illegitimate government purpose may travel remains to be seen. Certainly, Romer puts a new twist on bare animosity rational basis
review by disqualifying a whole new set of private motivations
from consideration in public discourse, at least when the imposition of a disability is at issue. But what is the source of this principle of mandatory separation between religious views of morality
and the exercise of state power? The following section considers
the "strict separation" and "bare animosity" principles in the con118. For further details of the religious nature of the struggle, see Gallagher,
supra note 94.
119. See Andrea M. Kimball, Note, Romer v. Evans and Colorado'sAmendment
2: The Gay Movement's Symbolic Victory in the Battle for Civil Rights, 28 U. TOL.
L. REV. 219, 242 (1996) (discussing Romer as an Establishment Clause case).
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text of the philosophical positions that best explain them-JeanJacques Rousseau's "no intolerance" principle and John Rawls's
"public reason" principle.
II.
A.

THE

PHILOSOPHY OF SEPARATION

Rousseau on IntolerantReligions-Precursorto the "Strict
Separationists"

If Jean-Jacques Rousseau is the "Father of the Modern
World," 120 he is even more the father of the "modern" strand of
liberalism, 1 21 at least insofar as it manifests critical skepticism
toward religion. Although some of the criticisms of Rousseau have
missed the mark-he has falsely been accused of harboring atheistic beliefs and advocating totalitarianism _122 he did lay the
foundation for the modern intolerance of religious participation in
public affairs. And this, despite the fact that the single negative
dogma of his famous (or infamous) civil religion is "no
123
intolerance!"
Upon closer examination, it appears that this "no intolerance"
maxim is founded upon the understanding that "[i]ntolerance is
something which belongs to the religions we have rejected."' 2 4
Rousseau thus rejects religious intolerance by advocating intolerance of intolerant religions. 12 1 Intolerant religions are inimical. to
120. THOMAS P. NEILL, MAKERS OF THE MODERN MIND 189 (1949).
121. By "modern" liberalism, I mean to refer to "[a] liberalism based on
individualism, independence, and rationalism [which] has a tendency to see
traditional religion as authoritarian, irrational, and divisive-as a potential
threat to our democratic institutions." Michael W. McConnell, "God is Dead and
We Have Killed Him!" Freedom of Religion in the Post-ModernAge, 1993 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 163, 173.
122. See ANNE M. OSBORN, ROUSSEAU AND BURKE: A STUDY OF THE IDEA OF
LIBERTY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY

POLITICAL

THOUGHT

12 (1964); JOHN W.

CHPMAN, ROusSEAu-ToTALITARIAN OR LIBERAL?, NO. 589, COLUMBIA STUDIES

IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1956); Charles H. Lincoln, Rousseau and the French
Revolution, 10 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL

SCIENCE 54-72 (1897).
123. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL. CONTRACT 186 (Maurice Cranston
trans., Penguin Classics 1968).
124. Id.
125. As one commentator has noted: "Rousseau specifies intolerance as the
single negative dogma of the civil religion; on the other hand, Rousseau wants an
intolerant religion. He cannot tolerate rejection of his civil religion, though he
will tolerate beliefs which go beyond it." Theodore J. Koontz, Religion and
Political Cohesion: John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau, 23 J. CHURCH &
STATE 95, 111 (1981).
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the civil state because it is impossible to distinguish between theological intolerance and religious intolerance; "[tihese two forms of
intolerance are inseparable."1 2 6 This follows from the (empirical?)
fact that "[it is impossible to live in peace with people one believes
to be damned; to love them would be to hate God who punishes
them; it is an absolute duty either to redeem or to torture
them."1 2 7 In any society where intolerant religions are tolerated,
"civil consequences" are inevitable: "[T]he sovereign is no longer
sovereign, even in the temporal sphere; at this stage the priests
become the real masters, and kings are only their officers."128
In support of this intolerance paradigm, Rousseau offers the
example of a fictitious country in which, due to a spirit of religious
intolerance, the clergy capture the sole right to license marriages.1 2 9 This single power over the making of one type of civil
contract will soon leave the prince without subjects, and the
church in sole control of the civil state:
Enable priests to decide whether to marry people according to
their assent to this or that doctrine, their assent to this or that
formula, or according to their being more or less devout, then is it
not clear that if the clergy acts shrewdly and holds firm, it will in
time alone dispose of inheritances, offices, the citizens and the
state itself, since the latter cannot endure if composed only of
30
bastards?
To counteract this intolerance effect, Rousseau proposes the
establishment of a civil religion. Rousseau's choice of terminology
should not lead the reader to understand that he supports the
establishment of a religion in the traditional sense. His civil religion bears few of the marks of contemporary European state religions-for example the established churches of England,' 3 '
Russia, or pre-revolutionary France.1 32 Rousseau wants only to
126. Id.
127. Id. at 186-87.
128. Id. at 187.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. On features of the Church of England, see ARLIN M. ADAMS AND CHARLES
J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED To RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 53-54 (1990); URSULA
HENRIQUES, RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN ENGLAND

1787-1833 (1961).

132. Rousseau had no use for the traditional European established churches.
See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, MEN AND CITIZENS: A STUDY OF ROUSSEAU'S SOCIAL
THOUGHT 117 (1969). Indeed, French clergymen blamed on Rousseau the
National Assembly's requirement that all French clergymen take an oath of
allegiance to the goals of the French Revolution, which purportedly was intended
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control the outward manifestations of religious belief insofar as
they impact upon others. He has no interest in maintaining the
purity of religious dogma, or involving the state in the adjudication of religious disputes.
The right which the social pact give the sovereign over subjects does not.., go beyond the boundaries of public utility. Subjects have no duty to account to the sovereign for their beliefs
except when those beliefs are important to the community. Now it
is very important to the state that each citizen should have a religion which makes him love his duty, but the dogmas of that religion are of interest neither to the state nor its members, except in
so far as those dogmas concern morals and the duties which everyone who professes that religion is bound to perform towards
others. Moreover, everyone may hold whatever opinions he
pleases, without the sovereign having any business to take cognizance of them. For the sovereign has not competence in the other
world; whatever may be the fate of the subjects in the life to come,
it is nothing to do with the sovereign, so long as they are good
13 3
citizens in this life.
Thus, despite Rousseau's lip service to a "no intolerance"
maxim, he in fact proposes to establish a civil religion to which all
citizens must adhere, saving however the liberty to maintain tolerant personal beliefs as one likes them. On the one hand, this
formulation resembles the belief/action distinction first enunciated in Reynolds v. United States134 and resurrected in Employment Division v. Smith.135 But while Rousseau's proposition
contains a weak "free exercise" component akin to the current
First Amendment standard, it contains a corollary "no intolerance" component that in effect disenfranchises most traditional
religions from participation in public affairs, and probably even
residence within the boundaries of the state. Unlike Enlightenment separationists, such as John Locke 1 36 and Thomas Jefferto lead to the demise of Catholicism. TIMOTHY TACKETT,

RELIGION, REVOLUTION

63 (1986). Others
charged Rousseau with instigating the "atheism and loose morality" of the
Revolution. Lincoln, supra note 123 at 54-72.
133. Rousseau, supra note 124 at 185-86.
134. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
135. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the Court held that "an individual's
religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate." Id. at 878-79.
136. Although supporting the institutional separation of church and state,
Locke denied that such separation deprived the magistrate of jurisdiction over

AND REGIONAL CULTURE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY

FRANCE
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son, 1 37 who proposed to separate the institutions of church and
state, Rousseau is skeptical that an orderly society can rest upon a
separation between political and religious ideals. 131 "Rousseau
privatizes religion by deinstitutionalizing religions dealing with
matters of personal salvation, attaining a pure understanding of
God and the like, while also creating another separate religion
concerned with undergirding the state."' 39 Religion must play a
positive role in society, "both in providing justification for the
social contract and in enhancing the civic spirit, while preventing
warlikeness apt to result from a pure 'religion
the intolerance and
0
of the citizen.' "14
The "tolerant" religion Rousseau would allow the citizen finds
expression in The Creed of a Priest of Savoy." 4 Speaking as an
old priest instructing his acolyte, Rousseau sets forth his princimoral actions, which belong "to the jurisdiction of the outward and inward court,
. . . both of the magistrate and conscience." John Locke, A Letter Concerning
Toleration, in POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 421 (David Wootton, ed.
1993). Locke's general political theory provides support for a libertarian
limitation on the use of state power, extending the magistrate's jurisdiction only
to such evils as are "prejudicial to other men's rights" or "break the peace of
societies." Id. at 417. However, the range of negative externalities over which
the magistrate exercises jurisdiction should not be understood in the narrow
modern sense. The magistrate retained the power to punish the perpetrators of
moral externalities, such as those who "lustfully pollute themselves in
promiscuous uncleanness." Id. At 414. For Locke's views on the establishment
question, see generally Koontz, supra note 126.
137. Jefferson drafted Virginia's landmark Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom which contained a strong disestablishment principle. His famous
Danbury Baptist letter reappropriated Roger Williams's "wall of separation
metaphor," which eventually made into the lexicography of establishment clause
jurisprudence. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
Additionally, Jefferson wrote derisively of the common law jurists such as Sir
Matthew Hale, Lord Mansfield, and William Blackstone who called Christianity
part of the common law of England. See Letter to Dr. Thomas Cooper of February
10, 1814 in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS at 1321-29 (Merrill D. Peterson, ed., 1984).
Nonetheless, Jefferson was overall a conventional moralist. In 1778, he drafted a
Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments for the Virginia Legislature,
which included the prohibition of sodomy, although not bestiality which "cannot
be injurious to society." Id. At 356 n. 25.
138. See Koontz, supra note 126 at 99 ("Although Rousseau shares Locke's
interest in making religion a private matter he is skeptical of the view that a wall
of separation can be erected between the institutions of church and state.").
139. Id.
140. Id. at 96.
141. For the recognition of this linkage between Rousseau's description of the
"religion of man" in the civil religion chapter of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT and the
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ples of naturalistic deism: the will moves the universe and ani143
mates nature; 14 2 divine intelligence governs the universe;
happiness results from justice;1 4 4 conscience derives from innate
ideas and not from learning. 1 4 5 These broad, innocuous principles
of natural religion contrast with the intolerant creeds of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.'14 Traditional religions, with their
macabre fixation on damnation
and salvation, threaten the very
14 7
fabric of social order.
The duty of following and loving the religion of one's country
does not extend to dogmas contrary to good morality, such as that
of intolerance. It is that horrible dogma which arms men against
on another, and makes them all enemies of mankind. The distinction between civil tolerance and religious tolerance is childish and
vain. Those two tolerances are inseparable, and one cannot omit
one without the other. Even angels cannot live in peace with men
14
whom they regard as enemies of God.'
In practical effect, Rousseau creates two religious requirements for citizenship. First, the citizen must at least adhere to
the minimal requirements of the civil religion, that is that every
citizen "love his duty."1 49 Second, the citizen may adhere to further religious beliefs, but such beliefs may not be "intolerant."
Indeed, if the savoyard priest is to be our model, then these pri150
vate and tolerant beliefs should not even be disclosed to others.
passage that follows from

THE CREED OF A PRIEST OF SAVOY, I am indebted to
Koontz, supra note 126 at 99.
142. JEAN-JACQUES RouSSEAU, THE CREED OF A PRIEST OF SAVOY 14 (Arthur
H. Beattie trans., Continuum 2d ed. 1957).
143. Id. at 16.
144. Id. at 29.
145. Id. at 42.
146. THE CREED OF A PRIEST OF SAVOY at 65-67.
147. Rousseau equates his notion of intolerance, which he raises continuously
in THE CREED OF A PRIEST OF SAVOY, with a belief in damnation. See id. at 76
("God forbid that I should ever preach to them the cruel doctrine of intolerance,
that I should ever incline them to detest their fellow man, to say to other men,
You will be damned!").
148. Id. at 76 n. 18.
149. SOCIAL CONTRACT at 185. Rousseau specifies further tenants of the civil
religion, "the existence of an omnipotent, intelligent benevolent divinity that
foresees and provides; the life to come; the happiness of the just; the punishment
of sinners; the sanctity of social contract and law," Id. at 187, but each of these
requirements seems tailored to the necessity of social control, this "love of duty."
150. At the conclusion of his creed, the priest tells his young acolyte:
I have just, my young friend, recited to you orally my profession of faith as God
reads it in my heart. You are the first to whom I have presented it; you are
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Thus, Rousseau creates a minimum religious requirement for citizenship-adherence to the social values required by the civil religion-and a maximum allowance for religious beliefs beyond the
requirements of civil religion-that they be tolerant of other views
and quietly held.
How, then, does Rousseau's paradigm figure in the strand of
Establishment Clause thinking that denies to religion any right to
participate in the formulation of public policy? On the one hand,
the formal distinction between Rousseau's proposal to establish a
state religion and our constitutional prohibition on the establishment of religion would seem to place the two positions in direct
opposition. On the other hand, Rousseau's civil religion, concerned as it is with love of duty and civic virtue, shares far more
with the republican ethicism of Robert Bellah and his legal academic followers than with the theistic Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam that Rousseau considered "intolerant."' 51 Far from "establishing a religion," as that concept is commonly understood in historical context,' 5 2 Rousseau's civil "religion" requires no more
than a commitment to the ethical goals of the state, a requirement
which by contemporary standards does not seem particularly
religious.153
perhaps the only one to whom I shall ever do so. So long as there remains some
good belief among men, one must not disturb peaceful souls nor alarm the faith
of simple people by difficulties which they cannot resolve, and which worry them
without enlightening them.
CREED OF A PRIEST OF SAVOY at

78.

151. Focusing on the link between republican civic virtue and the need for a
unifying civil religion, Bellah asserts that "the American case" includes "the
worship of a higher reality that upholds the standards the republic attempts to
embody." Robert N. Bellah, Religion and Legitimationin the American Republic,
in ROBERT N. BELLAH AND PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, VARIETIES OF CIVIL RELIGION
12-13 (1980). Sanford Levinson has adapted Bellah's sociology to the language of
law by focusing on the Constitution as the sacred text of the American civil
religion. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). For other sources of
discussion on this topic, see Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); W. Lance Bennett, Imitation, Ambiguity, and Drama in
PoliticalLife: Civil Religion and the Dilemmas of Public Morality, 41 J. POL. 106

(1979);

GAIL GEHRIG, AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION: AN ASSESSMENT

(1979)

152. See supra note 132.
153. Rousseau's notion of a civil religion was not dissimilar to the republican
virtues many of the framers, including committed separationists, believed must
undergird the American democratic experiment. See Jerry H. Combe, Religious
Roots of the Rights of Man, in RELIGION AND POLITIcs (Fred E. Baumann and
Kenneth M. Jensen eds, 1989).
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I have chosen Rousseau as a paradigm of Establishment
Clause thinking not for what he says about the establishment of a
civil religion (which, in the modern context, I do not find particularly interesting), but for what he says about the role of theistic
religion in civil society. In particular, his labeling of traditional
theistic dogma as dangerously intolerant strikes me as the precise
philosophy underlying actual purpose review under the Establishment Clause. Of course, modern constitutionalists who believe
that state action should not rest upon religious conviction would
vigorously deny that this principle extends to state prohibition of
private religious beliefs, intolerant though they are, as Rousseau
seems to advocate."' Nonetheless, in denying to the religiously
devout the right to participate in the formation of public policy,
the strict separationist position erects a religious classification for
citizenship, similar in kind, if not equal in degree, to Rousseau's.
To appreciate this point, one need only consider the extent to
which contemporary constitutional culture has focused on representation reinforcement as the keystone to equal citizenship.
After all, footnote four of Carolene Products, that "great and modern charter" of American constitutionalism, 5 ' invites the strictest
of scrutinies on "legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about the
repeal of undesirable legislation."' 5 6 In the modern dispensation,
the chief political function of the courts is to inquire "whether the
opportunity to participate either in the political processes by
which values are appropriately identified and accommodated, or
in the accommodation those processes have reached, has been
unduly constricted."' 5 7 Unsurprisingly, many of the Supreme
Court's landmark decisions since the New Deal have focused on
"clearing the channels of political change,""5 ' striking down barriers to process-oriented functions such as free speech, free association, voting rights, campaign financing, and jury participation.

154. To the contrary, the modern mantra appears to be that "[pirivate biases
may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1983). See Steven G.
Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Constitutional Command?, 70 IND. L. J. 331 (1995).
155. Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 6 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
156. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938).
157. Ely, supra note 78 at 77.
158. Id. at 105-34.
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This emphasis on structure and process has been driven by an
obsession with equality of citizenship, 1 5 9 the principle that "[elach
individual is presumptively entitled to be treated by the organized
society as a respected, responsible, and participating member."' 6 °
In the modern context, the state cannot sin more gravely than to
exclude any voice from the public forum, from an equal say in the
formation of public policy. Indeed, Frank Michelman defines citizenship as "direct participation ... in the determination of common affairs."1 61 Just as for Aristotle the man outside the polis is
no man at all, but rather a beast or a god, 1 6 2 the American resident without a political voice is no citizen at all, but rather an
alien or an outsider.
If the right to participate in public deliberation makes one a
citizen, it is not too difficult to see that a rule prohibiting a class of
residents from seeking legal sanction for their religiously
informed preferences has the effect of denying citizenship to members of that class. Thus, Rousseau, who would forbid Catholics to
remain in the state, 163 differs only in degree from the strict separationist who would permit Catholics to stay, but would forbid
them any participation in the process of self-governance. 1 64 Both
Rousseau and the separationist draw a citizenship classification
on the basis of religion. That Rousseau banishes the Catholic
159. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING To AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1989) (Equal citizenship "has long served the nation as a unifying
ideal and has emerged in our own time as a principle of American constitutional
law."). See also Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 term-Foreward:
Equal Citizenship under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARv.L. REV. 1 (1977).
160. Id. at 3.
161. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term-Foreward:Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4, 27 (1987); see also James L. Fleming,
Securing DeliberativeAutonomy, 48 STAN.L. REV. 1, 22 (1995) (advancing theory
of constitutional constructivism whose first theme is "to secure the preconditions
for political self-government, conceiving our political system as a public facility
for deliberation concerning the common good.").
162. THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 6 (Ernest Barker, trans., Oxford, 2d ed. 1958).
163. Much of Rousseau's discussion of religion in THE SocIAL CONTRACT
appears to be directed against Roman Catholicism, which belonged to "his most
despised category of religion." Koontz, supra note 126 at 101.
164. At this point I anticipate the response that no one proposes to exclude
Catholics and other traditional religionists from public debate, but merely to
forbid them to bring their Catholic viewpoints to the public forum. This is much
the same as saying, "We won't exclude Marxists from public debate so long as
they don't advance any Marxist views."
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while the strict separationist allows him to remain as a resident
alien is a distinction with minimal significance.
Not only do Rousseau and the strict separationists concur in
eliminating the privileges of citizenship of traditional religionists,
but they concur in motivation as well. The single great theme of
Rousseau's discussion of religion in The Social Contract is the disruptive effect on civil society of intolerant religion. Intolerance,
again, "is that horrible dogma which arms men against on
another, and makes them all enemies of mankind." 6 5 By insisting that those who do not share their religious convictions will be
damned, Rousseau believes, the "intolerant" introduce a dangerous and destructive element into society.
Much the same motivation appears to inspire the strict
separationists. As Justice Stevens explained in Wallace v. Jaffree,
"the political interest in forestalling intolerance extends beyond
intolerance among Christian sects-or even intolerance among
'religions'-to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever and the
uncertain." 6' Intolerance, then, is the touchstone of the Establishment Clause. But what is meant by "intolerance?" Whereas
Rousseau defines intolerance as a belief in damnation, the strict
separationists understand intolerance as the insistence that
others behave the way the religious think they should behave for
no better reason than that religious teachings support that behavioral norm. Not surprisingly, strict separationists often characterize the legal norms that have drawn their most intense fire,
especially prohibitions on abortion and homosexual conduct, as
the products of "religious intolerance."' 7 Rarely do they take
after public policy initiatives which are motivated by religious
views but nonetheless are not "intolerant," for example welfare
bills motivated by Christian beneficence or environmental regulations motivated by the desire to preserve "the Lord's creation."
Like Rousseau, the strict separationists find offense and danger in
religions that seek to impose "intolerant" moral standards on persons outside of the religious community.
165. CREED OF A PRIEST OF SAVOY, supra note 142 at 76 n. 18.
166. 472 U.S. 38, 54 (1985).
167. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 212 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See also Andrea M. Kimball, Note, Romer v. Evans and Colorado'sAmendment 2:
The Gay Movement's Symbolic Victory in the Battle for Civil Rights, 28 U. TOL. L.
REV. 219, 242 (1996) (describing Amendment 2 as "an example of religious
intolerance against homosexuals").
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In short, both Rousseau and the strict separationists would
exclude from full citizenship adherents to traditional, "intolerant"
religions. To understand the full implications of this position for
the role of religion in modern life, we must first turn to the philosophical roots of the other head of constitutional doctrine that is
beginning to challenge religious participation in public affairs.
B.

Rawls on Religion and Public Reason-The Philosophy of
Bare Animosity and Religion

In the past several years, few writers on the role of religion in
political choice have captured the imagination of the legal academic community more than John Rawls. His Political Liberalism 6 ' has become a central focus of discussion in the ongoing
dialogue over religion and public reason. 1 69 In his earlier classic,
A Theory of Justice, Rawls assumed the existence of a "wellordered society" in which all citizens adopt a "comprehensive philosophical doctrine" which accepts "justice as fairness."'7 0 In Political Liberalism, Rawls confronts the problem with this
assumption, namely that "[a] modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines, but by a pluralism of incompatible
yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines."'v' Since not all citizens
affirm any single comprehensive philosophical doctrine, and it is
unreasonable to believe that they will at any time in the foreseeable future,' 7 2 Rawls asks the following question: "how is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and
equal citizens who still remain profoundly divided by reasonable
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?"' 7 3
168. JOHN RAwLs,

POLITICAL LIBERALISM

(1993), revised in 1996.

169. Some of the principal works addressing Rawls's discussion of religion and
public reason include: Lawrence B. Solum, Novel Public Reasons, 29 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 1459 (1996); Kurt T. Lash, Voluntary Restraintand the Wormhole Effect, 29
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1401 (1996); Michael J. Perry, Religious Arguments in Public
Political Debate, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1421 (1996); Kent Greenawalt, Some
Problems with Public Reason in John Rawls's PoliticalLiberalism, 29 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 1303 (1995); Elizabeth H. Wolgast, The Demands of Public Reason, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1936 (1994); Lawrence B. Solum, Constructingan Ideal of Public
Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (1993).
170. Rawls, supra note 169 at xviii.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 47.
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Rawls answers this question at some length, but the short
answer is that "the basic structure of such a just and stable] society is effectively regulated by a political conception of justice that
is the focus of an overlapping consensus of at least the reasonable
comprehensive doctrines affirmed by its citizens."' 7 4 Thus, the
state may legitimately exercise its coercive power only pursuant to
constitutional principles and aspirations within the zone of the
overlapping consensus, which "all citizens may reasonably be
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable
to them as reasonable and rational." 1 75 From this, it follows that
reasons given in support of the exercise of the state's coercive
power, at least as to "constitutional essentials," 1 76 must derive
from the zone of overlapping consensus. Borrowing on a phrase
from Kant,' 7 7 Rawls sets out to define the appropriate domain in
democratic society of "public reason," that is "the reason of equal
citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over one7 8 another in enacting laws and in amending
their constitution."'
Not surprisingly, the public reason criterion does not bode
well for religious participation in the formation of public policy.
According to Rawls, the content of public reason must be based on
"presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found
in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science
when these are not controversial." 7 9 Obviously, religion is out.
"[Iun discussing constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines-to what we as individual members of
associations see as the whole truth . . ."1o Rawls pauses briefly
to consider whether this principle undermines the moral authority
(understood in terms of liberal democratic legitimacy) of the abolitionists and civil rights movement advocates who appealed
174. Id. at 48.
175. Id. at 217.
176. See infra text accompanying notes 181.
177. Rawls, supra note 169 at 213 n. 2. See also Solum, supra note 170 at 1463
n. 9, citing Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment',
in POLITICAL WRITINGS 54 (H. Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991).
178. Rawls, supra note 169 at 214. Rawls began his discussion of public reason
in The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV.
233, 244 (1989). The phrase does not appear in his seminal A THEORY OF
JUSTICE

(1971).

179. Id. at 224.
180. Id. at 224-25.
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directly to divine authority in confronting the evils of slavery and
segregation.' 8 ' He concludes that it does not, but only because
their appeal to comprehensive religious views was "required to
give sufficient strength to the political conception to be subsequently realized."' s2 In other words, an appeal to comprehensive
religious views is appropriate only when contextually necessary to
establish an overlapping political consensus, which will in turn
provide the basis for future moral claims on the same subject, and
presumably make further religious appeals inappropriate." 3
Two limitations on the domain of public reason should be
noted. First, Rawls would confine the limits of public reason to
issues involving "'constitutional essentials' and questions of basic
justice."" 4 Public reason is "to settle such fundamental questions
as: who has the right to vote, or what religions are to be tolerated,
or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity, or to hold
property. ' ' 8 5 This leaves many political questions-such as tax
legislation, property regulations, environmental controls, and
funding for the arts-beyond the requirements of public reason.' 6
Second, Rawls urges public reason as a hortatory norm of
public discourse, not as a constitutional principle to be enforced by
the courts. Although the norm of public reason applies "to the
judiciary and above'all to a supreme court in a constitutional
democracy with judicial review,"187 it not a matter of law.' 8 In
other words, the judiciary should strive to speak in the language
of public reason, but it need not consider itself nor the citizens
whose actions it judges legally bound to such a standard.
Neither of these limitations that Rawls places on the domain
of public reason has particularly affected the scope of the public
reason principle as reflected in Supreme Court decisions under
181. Id. at 249-51.
182. Id. at 251.
183. In a footnote, Rawls states this fairly explicitly: "This suggests that it may
happen for a well-ordered society to come about in which public discussion may
require that comprehensive reasons be invoked to strengthen those values." The
Domain of the Politicaland Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. at 251 n.
41. Of course, once the well-ordered society is in place, the usual constraints of
public reason would apply.
184. Id. at 214.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 216.
188. Id. at 213 ("That public reason should be so understood and honored by
citizens is not, of course, a matter of law.").
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the establishment or equal protection clauses. Because legal decisions under these clauses inevitably concern "constitutional essentials," public reason should be used in every such case,
presumably by the state actors whose decisions are under review,
and by the Court itself.' 9 Although Rawls may understand public reason as a moral goal of democratic citizenship rather than a
legal doctrine, it is a small step to convert the public reason principle into a constitutional doctrine, as I argue the Supreme Court
itself has done. It has thus become clear that the idea of public
reason, with all its attendant implications, is a fair ground for discussion in constitutional cases and controversies. 190
The political norm of public reason is easily recast into the
mold of equal protection rational basis review. To say that a use
of coercive state power-must rest, at a minimum, upon a rational
basis is to exclude from the province of legitimate public deliberation at least irrational bases for state action. After Romer, the
rational basis standard also appears to exclude the exercise of
coercive state power on the basis of extra-rational premises.
Translating this theory into the language of Rawls, the set of public reasons sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of state action
excludes both irrational and extra-rational bases. Assuming that
religion belongs to the set of extra-rational bases, an assumption
not free from controversy' 9 ' but one nonetheless implicitly
189. Additionally, it did not take too long for the legal academic community to
expand the public reason principle beyond "constitutional essentials" to cover all
political issues. See Perry, Religious Arguments in Public PoliticalDebate, supra

note 170 at 1447-48 (discussing the "ideal of public reason.., as if it applied to
political questions beyond just "constitutional essentials" and matters of basic
justice'"); Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 729, 738-39 (1993) (arguing for extension of public reason
principle to "all coercive uses of state power").
190. I assume that if the principle belonged solely to the realm of political
philosophy, as Rawls perhaps intended, it would not have made such a splash in
the law reviews.
191. The facile differentiation between religion and rationality or reason
remains the target of substantial discussion. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 17 at
175 (defending creationism as a rational explanation "[gliven its starting point
and methodology"); Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization
of Religion, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 19, 71-72 (1991) (rejecting binary distinction

between rationality and religion); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and
Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAuL L. REV. 1019, 1029-32

(1990) (discussing five bases for religious convictions and concluding that
"religious convictions as a whole [cannot] be lumped into a big category called
nonrational"). Nonetheless, the distinction continues to play a considerable role
in the debate over the role of religion in the formation of public policy. See
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accepted by the Court in Romer, 9 2 religion too falls outside of the
19 3
class of public reason.
In the early "bare animosity" cases, the prejudices underlying
the unconstitutional legislative classifications were irrational in
the sense that they lacked any mooring in a comprehensive view
of the public good. An unthinking, knee-jerk dislike of hippies,'
1 96
the children of illegal aliens, 19 5 and the mentally retarded
might be beyond the reaches of the law because the law has no
power to coerce the mind directly, but it could not form the basis of
state action disadvantaging those groups. One recalls the oftquoted maxim of Palmore v. Sidoti that "[pirivate biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." 1 97 In other words, although private
Suzanna Sherry, Enlighteningthe Religion Clauses, 7 J.

CoNTEp. LEGAL ISSUES

473, 478 (1996) ("The most basic tenets of reach religion tend to be supported
primarily by faith rather than reason, and indeed few religious claims could be
justified by observation and rational argument."); Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining
Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309, 385-91 (1994)
(defining religion as "a manifestly non-rational (i.e. faith-based) belief concerning
the alleged nature of the universe"); Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life and
Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 678 (1992) (Religious belief in the
Western tradition centers on a transcendent force of belief-that is, a force of
belief beyond the material, phenomenal world. As such, religious belief is not
subject to verification or falsification according to the objectivist conventions of
public life.); Stephen G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the
Accommodation of Religion under the Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment,
52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 75, 167 (1990) ("Religious principles are not based on logic or
reason, and, therefore, may not be proved or disproved.");
192. See supra text accompanying notes 109-20.
193. Rawls does not necessarily dismiss religion as unreasonable; rather he
posits that it falls outside the boundaries of public reason. To the extent that
Rawls defines reasonableness in Kantian terms as the "willingness to propose
principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them
willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so," Rawls, supra note
169 at 49, there is no particular impediment to religion informing public policy,
because religions generally agree that their own adherents should be bound by
the standards that they seek to universalize. Nonetheless, Rawls also insists
that reasonable persons propose social constructs in terms that, given the
constraint of immutable difference of opinion on fundamental matters, other free
and equal persons could be expected to accept. Id. at 50. This specification
excludes religion, even if reasonable, from the domain of public reason.
194. United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
195. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
196. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
197. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1983).
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action, or at least attitude, may rest upon mere bias,1 98 law may
not. Naked animosity does not appear in the unwritten canon of
constitutional "public reasons."
In the language of Rawls, these classic forms of naked animosity might be said to represent a species of "object-dependent
desires," or perhaps "object-dependent dislikes." That is to say,
"the object of the desire [or dislike], or the state of affairs that
fulfills it, can be described without the use of moral conceptions, or
reasonable or rational principles." 199 Object-dependent desires
include "such bodily desires as those for food and drink and sleep;
desires to engage in pleasurable activities of innumerable kinds as
well as desires that depend on social life: desires for status, power
and glory, and for property and wealth." 20 0 We might add to this
our own list of object-dependent dislikes, for example a raw negative utility function for the color of a person's skin or dislike for a
person's behavior based upon subliminal psychological factors.
When the state gives these object-dependent desires (or dislikes)
immediate legal sanction, the resulting state action cannot be said
to rest upon a viable public reason, but rather upon a matter of
pure (usually selfish) taste, or, to put it in Cass Sunstein's words,
a naked preference.2 °1
Unlike true naked preferences or object-dependent desires,
religious motivations fall into the category of "conception-dependent desires." The actor motivated by a conception-dependent
desire wishes to be "seen as belonging to, and as helping to articulate, a certain rational or reasonable conception, or political
ideal."20 2 For Rawls, the operative conception-dependent desire of
political liberalism "is the ideal of citizenship as characterized in
justice as fairness. "203 By examining the "structure and content of
this conception of justice" we discover how, "by the use of the original position, the principles and standards of justice for society's
basic institutions belong to and help to articulate the conception of
reasonable and rational citizens as free and equal."20 4 The conception-dependent desire of political liberalism-justice as fairness-leads us again to the "free and equal citizen" specification,
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

A dubious proposition given the proliferation of anti-discrimination laws.
Rawls, supra note 169 at 82.
Id.
Sunstein, supra note 73.
Rawls, supra note 169 at 84.
Id.
Id.
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which provides the normative basis for insisting on rule according
to overlapping consensus rather than comprehensive religious (or
otherwise) world views. Thus, even though religion may fall into
the category of conception-dependent desires, as opposed to objectdependent desires, which clearly may form the basis of public policy, religious considerations are not the sort of conception-dependent desires that can properly form the basis of public policy in a
liberal democratic society.
Understood as a principle of constitutional government,
Rawls' "public reason" principle informs the "legitimate purpose"
prong of rational basis analysis.2 °5 In determining whether or not
a particular end of state of action is legitimate, judges cannot simply flip open their pocket constitutions to the "legitimate purposes" article. Rather, they must write (or perhaps they simply
have written) their own list. As of yet, the Supreme Court has not
enunciated a single system for determining what purposes appear
in the good book.20 6 Some particularly "invidious "27 purposes are
out-racial preference being the obvious example.20 s Beyond the

205. Traditional rational basis review consists of two distinct prongs. The
means/ends prong asks whether the means chosen is rationally related to the
end. The legitimate purpose prong asks whether the end is itself legitimate. For
the seminal article on this point, see Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroeck, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949); see also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIoNAL LAw

§ 16-2, at 1439-40 (2d ed. 1988).

206. See Farell, supra note 71 at 43 ("Although the Supreme Court.,speaks
frequently of permissible and impermissible purposes (i.e. every time it states
the doctrine of rationality review), it has not systematically articulated the
criteria that distinguish permissible from impermissible legislative purposes.").
207. Although the Supreme Court has stated that the equal protection clause
prohibits "invidious discrimination," see Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,
489 (1955), I have yet to see a definition of the word "invidious" appear in a
Supreme Court opinion. I rather suspect that "invidious" signifies "meanspirited," which is an appealing moral concept, but hardly translates well into a
doctrine of constitutional law.
208. The current debate over what interests justify "benign" racial preferences
underlines the extent to which subtle differences in stated purpose can either
make or break a racial classification. See Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d
1547 (3d Cir.), cert.granted, U.S. , 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997) (Title VII does not
permit an employer with a racially balanced work force to use a non-remedial
preference in order to promote racial diversity.); Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (Racial diversity does not count as a compelling interest
for equal protection purposes.), cert. denied sub nom Thurgood Marshall Legal
Society v. Hopwood, U.S. , 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
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obvious gremlins, however,
determining what purposes count as
"rational" is no easy task.20 9
Rawls' formulation of the principle of public reason offers an
appealing conceptual framework within which to state the problem and attempt to organize a solution. Reading Romer in light of
its precedents, an implicit Rawls-like paradigm begins to emerge.
I do not suggest here that PoliticalLiberalism and its philosophical antecedents are necessarily responsible for the Romer opinion
in a causal sense, i.e. that they informed the majority's thinking,
although I do not discard that possibility either.21 0 Rather, I
think that in the modern context, any attempt to justify the emergent pattern as coherent and correct would likely take a Rawlsian
form. In particular, the connection between what I have called the
earlier object-dependent desire cases, Moreno, Cleburne, and Plyler, and Romer, which appears to me be a clear case of the expression of a conception-dependent desire that the Court nonetheless
found illegitimate, must rest upon the assumption that the political liberal regime established by the equal protection clause (and
the Constitution more generally) impugns all purposes of a certain
character, whether object-dependent or conception-dependent.
But what is that "certain character" that accounts for the
delegitimization of so wide a panoply of possible state interests?
Extrapolating from the case outcomes, it is fair at least to hypothesize that the entire set of excluded interests consists of those that
are irrational or extrarational according to the criteria of liberal
democratic public reason, understood, as Rawls understands
them, as the products of the overlapping consensus which "all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational. 2 1 1
Such a formulation explains the inclusion in the category of
209. See Welch, supra note 69 at 83 (noting that the modifier "legitimate" is
not an immediately obvious component of equal protection clause review).
210. The majority's treatment of illegitimate purpose in Romer cannot easily
be pinned to any comprehensive constitutional standard of legitimacy because
the Court merely rests upon the finding that the State failed to link Amendment
2 to any legitimate purpose, leaving the classification "naked" for purposes of
equal protection review. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 ("We cannot say that
Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete
objective."). Above, I have argued that the Court implicitly rejected the religious
bases for the amendment, which although not advanced by the State were
certainly common knowledge, and, in any event, were "conceivable bases" for the
amendment, if that remains the standard.
211. Rawls, supra note 169 at 217.
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excluded public purposes of both object-dependent dislikes,
nakedly expressed in Moreno, Cleburne, and Plyler, and of conception-dependent dislikes, overtly expressed (and well-understood)
in religious terms in Romer. The overlapping consensus model of
rational basis review also fits well with the strict separationist
position that I have identified with Rousseau.2 1 2 To a synthesis of
these positions I now turn.
III.

DECANONIZING ENLIGHTENMENT AGNOSTICISM

The preceding sections have attempted to link Rousseau's
proposal to exclude from society "intolerant" religions with the
"strict separationist" view of the Establishment Clause, and
Rawls's view of public reason with the Supreme Court's emergent
standard of "bare animosity" rational basis review, as recently
expressed in Romer. This final section will attempt to demonstrate the interplay between the Rousseau/strict separationist
position and the Rawls/bare animosity positions, respond to some
potential objections to this characterization, and then offer a partial solution to the unfair (and ironic) outworking of this interplay.
A.

When Rawls and Rousseau Merge

The first step-demonstrating the interplay between the
Rawls and Rousseau principles-is not particularly challenging
because, upon analysis, the two principles present two sides of the
same Enlightenment coin. Although Rawls denies that his political liberalism is merely another variant of Enlightenment liberalism,2 13 there can be no serious question that Rawls, as much as
Rousseau, 214 is thoroughly a child of the Enlightenment.2 15 In
212. By this I mean that a strict separationist would find an independent
constitutional basis for affirming, as does Rawls, that the domain of legitimate
purposes excludes religious ones.
213. Rawls, supra note 169 at xl ("Political liberalism is not a form of
Enlightenment liberalism, that is, a comprehensive liberal and often secular
doctrine founded on reason and viewed as suitable for the modern age now that
the religious authority of Christian ages is said to be no longer dominant.
Political liberalism has no such aims.").
214. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
215. See Markus D. Dubber, The Pain of Punishment, 44 BuFF. L. REv. 454,
558 (1996) (describing Rawls as "our most systematic and thorough political
thinker in the enlightenment tradition"); Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class
Conundrum and the Pursuitof Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46
HASTINGS L. J. 1353, 1455 n. 133 (1995) (characterizing Rawls as "a philosophical
descendent of Enlightenment thinkers"); Linda R. Hirshman, Is the Original
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practical effect, both the Rawls and Rousseau principles have the
effect of privileging as a constitutional norm the Enlightenment
posture of deep suspicion tocard the participation of traditional
religions in the formation of public policy. Both views lend theoretical support to the increasingly held view that "[tihe establishment clause should be viewed as a reflection of the secular,
relativist political values of the Enlightenment, which are incompatible with the fundamental nature of religious faith," and that
"[a]s an embodiment of these Enlightenment values, the establishment clause requires that the political influence of religion be substantially diminished."2 1 6 Both positions even provide support for
classical-liberal pragmatists of Richard Posner's stripe, for whom
"the significance of pragmatism in relation to the Enlightenment
is in unmasking and challenging the Platonic, traditionalist, and
theological vestiges in Enlightenment thinking."2 17 In short, both
the Rousseau and the Rawls principles provide a constitutional
basis for completing the Enlightenment's political project with
respect to religion-complete privatization.
Despite the convergence of the two principles in practical
effect, on a doctrinal level they remain analytically distinct. Theoretically, a religiously motivated act of the state could transgress
the strict "separation principle" principle but not the bare animosity principle. Although it has become a matter of conventional
wisdom that all laws classify, 2 18 not all implicit classifications single out an identifiable group for disadvantageous treatment in a
Position Inherently Male-Superior?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1860, 1886 (1994)
(Rawls's "work is ultimately rooted in the universalistic assumptions of all
Enlightenment philosophy"); Anthony J. Fejfar, CorporateVoluntarism: Panacea
or Plague? A Question of Horizon, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 875-76 (1992)
(describing Rawls's theory as a "rationalist theory which proceeds from within
the tradition of Enlightenment liberalism"); compare Dale Jamieson, The Poverty
of Postmodernist Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 577, 587 (1991) ("The picture of
Rawls as an archetypal Enlightenment theorist in search of universal principles
rooted in human essences is a caricature.").
216. Gey, Why is Religion Special?, supra note 155 at 79.
217. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 394 (1995).
218. See David Bogen, GenerallyApplicable Law and the FirstAmendment, 26
Sw. U. L. REV. 201, 241 (1997); Amar, supra note 98 at 222; John Harrison,
Equality, Race Discrimination, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 CONST.
COMMENT.243, 255 n. 8 (1996); Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day:
The Subtle Transformation in JudicialArgument Over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L.
REV. 893, 969 n. 147 (1996); Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and
Underinclusion, 36 UCLA L. REV. 447, 456 (1989); see also Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72 (1979) ("Most laws classify, and
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way that appears to reflect animosity toward that group. For
example, I have trouble envisioning the result reached in
Edwards v. Aguillard21 9 being justified on equal protection
grounds, because the state action at issue-requiring the teaching
"creation science" in the public schools-did not place at disadvantage the group whose interests were threatened by the religious
intrusion-secularist adherents to a Darwinist explanation of
human origins.2 2 0 As a result of an earlier decision, 2 21 393 U.S. 97
(1968).222 that group already enjoyed the teaching of its views in
the schools. The sole question in Edwards was whether the constitutional prohibition on establishing religions prevented the
religiously motivated teaching of creationism alongside evolution.
Thus, the strict separationist position would invalidate religiously
motivated classifications that would bring the religiously supported position into equilibrium with the secularly supported position.2 2 3 By contrast, the bare animosity principle focuses, facially
at least, on whether the religiously supported position singles out
some group for disadvantage. Although an equal protection model
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence has its merits,2 2 4 the strict
many affect certain groups unevenly, even though the law itself treats them no
differently from all other members of the class described by the law.").
219. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
220. The Louisiana statute did of course relatively disadvantage Darwinists
vis A vis creationists insofar as before the law Darwinists held a monopoly on
teaching origins, and after the law they had to compete for the minds of the
young. This disadvantage, however, was comparative only, and in an absolute
sense, the law merely placed the Darwinists and creationists on an even keel.
221. Epperson v. Arkansas,

222. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
223. Of course, any reading of the Establishment Clause must take into
account the rather obvious fact that the clause necessarily disadvantages
religion to some extent. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal
Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 206 (1992) (noting that Establishment Clause
places unique disabilities on religion); Michael W. McConnell, A Response to
Professor Marshall, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 329 (1991) (noting that
Establishment Clause sometimes singles out religion for disadvantageous
treatment). It is a rather long jump from that realization, however, to the strict
separationist position which supports invalidation of all acts of the state that
rest primarily upon a religious motivation, whether or not the act itself is
particularly religious in nature.
224. See Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An
Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE
DAME

see

L. REV. 311 (1986). For a secularist account of the equal protection model,
KuRL. D, RELIGION AND THE LAw 18 (1962).

PHILLIP
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separationist and bare animosity models remain doctrinally distinct as to the role of religion in the formation of public policy.
Nonetheless, in practical effect the two principles work conjunctively and at times indistinguishably to ferret out the religious motivations lurking behind coercive uses of state power. On
the one hand, the bare animosity principle insists that the religious translate their views into non-religious terms when presenting public policy justifications for classifications disadvantaging
groups of individuals.2 25 The Supreme Court, however, offers no
assurances that it will accept the translated version at face value.
If the translated arguments look like nothing more than a cover
for a naked religious preference, as apparently they did in Romer,
they will be discounted, and the state action will be found to rest
on bare animosity. 2 26 Similarly, the strict separationist principle
requires the Court to second-guess the state's proffered justifications for a particular policy and ask whether it in fact rests upon
an "intolerant" religious motivation. If2it27 does, the policy may be
found to violate Establishment Clause.
At a more theoretical level, the interplay between the strict
separation and bare animosity principles results in a rather perverse irony. Presumably, the function of "bare animosity" review
is to ensure that a use of the state's coercive power rests upon
some basis other than (in Rawls's terms) an object-dependent
225. See infra text accompanying notes 238-39.
226. Romer involves an unusual "translation" situation, because Amendment 2
arose from a popularly initiated referendum, where the relevant "legislative
history" would have to be pieced together from newspaper accounts of the debate
over the amendment, rather than from sources traditionally referenced in the
search for the elusive legislative purpose, such as committee reports and the like.
This makes the translation enterprise in this context suspect for at least two
reasons. First, it is unreasonable to expect that news media accounts of a hotly
contested public referendum campaign will be able to distinguish citizens'
statements of their personal and intuitive views on the referendum from the
statements they might make if they were trying to persuade others to join their
side. Legislators, on the other hand, should be expected to go on record making
only those statements that reflect generalized public (i.e. "translated") appeals.
Second, if public choice theory has disabused us of the notion that even a body as
small as the United States Senate has a single "purpose" (which, if religiously
motivated, we would expect the Senators to "translate"), how ridiculous it is to
imagine that the citizenry of Colorado has a single "purpose" which, if motivated
by religious sentiment, could be translated into secular terms.
227. As indicated supra at text accompanying note 55, a majority of the Court
has never adopted the strict separationist position as such, insofar as it would
involve invalidating a non-obviously religious legislative enactment motivated
primarily by religious considerations.
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desire or (in my terms) an object-dependent dislike.2 2 In this
sense, a classification is naked or bare when it reflects nothing
more than a raw human reaction to a set of stimuli. 22 9 Rational
basis review sets a standard for deliberative democracy, demanding that legislative classifications result from thought and discussion rather than naked passion.230 All that is (arguably) well and
good until the bare animosity principle intersects the strict separation principle. Consider the instance of a citizen reflecting on a
proposed referendum which imposes a unique disability on a discrete group of people-say smokers. Intuitively, she dislikes
smokers and might well speak out in favor of the referendum simply on the basis of her animosity. But having become aware of the
bare animosity principle, she resolves to reflect further on the
issue to see if her dislike of smokers has any basis in a comprehensive view of social relationships. Upon reflection, she discovers
that in fact her animosity arises from her religiously informed
beliefs in the need to maintain a "pure" body and the imperative of
avoiding addictions. Now confident that she may speak out of a
comprehensive conviction rather than a knee-jerk reaction, our
citizen enters the arena of public debate.
To her surprise, our hypothetical citizen finds that in terms of
constitutional no-nos she has leapt from the frying pan into the
fire. Her reflection led her to a comprehensive view, but one
outside of Rawls's "overlapping consensus."23' Although our citizen accepted the challenge of "deliberative democracy" and formulated a justification for her vote that did not rest upon "bare
animosity," her religiously informed justification will fare no better than her nakedly hostile reaction to smokers. The justifications that the bare animosity principle nudged her to formulate
will run smack dab into the waiting arms of the strict separation
"no intolerance" principle. In the end, it will make no difference
whether she speaks before thinking or after thinking. The bare
animosity principle, as informed by the strict separation principle,
will discount any religious justification she may give for her vote,
228. See supra text accompanying notes 200.
229. In Romer, the majority characterized equal protection "nakedness" as "a
classification of persons undertaken for its own sake." 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
230. Cass Sunstein, in particular, has advocated the use of rational basis
review as a means nourishing "deliberative democracy" by ensuring "that all
decisions are supported by reasons of the right kind." Cass R. Sunstein, The
Supreme Court 1995 Term-Foreward:Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HAuv. L.
REV. 4, 37 (1996).

231. See supra text accompanying notes 175.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol21/iss2/1

46

1999]

Crane: Faith, Reason, and Bare Animosity

BARE ANIMOSITY

leaving her political choice "naked" for purposes of rational basis
review. 23 2 Our citizen will be deprived of any constitutionally permissible voice on the referendum, and in the process lose one of
the chief attributes of her putative citizenship.23 3
I anticipate at least two responses to this description of the
disenfranchising effect of the bare animosity and strict separation
principles. First, some would doubtlessly argue that my antismoker example is flawed because restrictions on smoking can
easily be justified by innumerable secular justifications, whereas
the constitutional limitation on religious purposes for coercive
uses of state power extends only to legislative classifications that
can only be supported by religious dogma. For example, Michael
Perry argues that "under the nonestablishment norm, government
may not make a political choice about the morality of human conduct unless a plausible secular rationale supports the choice."234
He does not believe that such a norm prevents legislators and
other public officials from "present[ing] religious arguments,
including religious arguments about the morality of human conduct, in public political debate."2 35 Justice Stevens sounded a similar note in his Webster dissent, arguing the abortion statute's
preamble "reflect[ed] nothing more than a difference in theological
doctrine" 2 36 and therefore lacked an identifiable secular purpose.2 3 7 In his view, the Missouri statute transgressed the establishment principle because it could only be supported by a
religious belief. Thus, one could argue that the twin constitutional norms discussed in this article do not require invalidation of
state action informed by religious beliefs so long as the action
could be independently supported by secular considerations.
232. Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs in Romer advanced an Establishment
Clause theory in opposition to Amendement 2, which died en route to the
Supreme Court. See Timothy M. Tymkovich, John Daniel Dailey, Paul Farley, A
Tale of Three Theories:Reasons and Prejudce in the Battle Over Amendment 2, 68
U. COLO. L. REv. 287, 333 n. 56 (discussing role of Establishment Clause
arguments in the Colorado District Court); see also Andrea M. Kimball, supra
note 120 at 242 (1996) (arguing that Amendment 2 violated the Establishment
Clause); Marc L. Rubinstein, Note, Gay Rights and Religion: A Doctrinal
Approach to the Argument that Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives Violate the
Establishment Clause, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 1585 (1995) (advancing Establishment
Clause arguments against anti-gay-rights intiaitives).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 155-166.
234. Perry, supra note 170 at 1426.
235. Id. at 1426-27.
236. 492 U.S. at 568.
237. Id. at 566-67.
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This view appears to be predicated on the assumption that
the religious citizen or legislator who presents an argument in
favor of a public policy position should rely on a parallel secular
justification for the policy choice instead of on a religious basis.
Professor Greenawalt has argued that legislators at least should
couch their arguments regarding public policy initiatives in the
language of public reason, even if their actual judgment rests
upon some religious view.23 8 Similarly, Robert Audi has argued
that "citizens [should] apply a kind of separation of church and
state in their public use of religious arguments," and that
"whatever religious arguments one may have..., one should also
be willing to offer, and be to a certain extend motivated by, adequate secular arguments for the same conclusions."2 3 9 Presumably, so long as the political proposition can be and is stated in
secular terms, it falls on the "mere coincidence" side of the Establishment Clause line.
Although "translation" may be a fitting hortatory aspiration
of liberal democracy, for at least three reasons it makes a poor
constitutional requirement. First, it fails as a matter of empirical
observation of Supreme Court practice. 24 0 As discussed in Section
1,241 on a number of occasions the Court has stricken statutes
despite the state's proffered secular justifications because the
Court has found that the classification in fact rested upon a religious purpose. For example, in the creationism cases, Epperson
and Edwards, the Court engaged in "actual basis review" of the
legislature's purpose in invalidating the creationist statutes.2 4 2
Similarly, in Wallace v. Jafree the Court held that "[iun applying
the purpose test, it is appropriate to ask 'whether government's
238. Kent Greenawalt, Religious Liberty and Democratic Politics, 23 N. Ky. L.
REV. 629, 638-39 (1996).
239. Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic
Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 677 (1993).
240. In Professor Perry's case, at least, I suppose that my empirical rebuttal to
his theoretical model may seem to miss the target because he is not responsible
for the Supreme Court's use of actual basis review. Nonetheless, to the extent to
which he has written favorably of my three examples of "actual basis review,"
see Michael J. Perry, Religion, Politics, and the Constitution, 7 J. CoNMP.
LEGAL IssuEs 407, 422-23 n. 39, 424-25 (1996) (approving of Epperson, Aguilard,
and Wallace), my rebuttal is fair.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 42-50. In addition to the three actual
basis cases discussed here, I think that Stone v. Graham,449 U.S. 39 (1980), and
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), qualify as
'actual purpose" cases.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 42-50.
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actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion, '"243 and proceeded to dissect the legislative history to uncover the legislature's
"actual purpose. " 2 , 4 Under that test, it would not have mattered if
the state could have justified its moment of silence by twenty
hypothetical and independent secular justifications because the
single, actual purpose of the statute was religious.
Simply put, a "translation" norm would not seem to undo the
mischief of the hard-searching "actual purpose" review characteristic of Romer and its Establishment Clause cousins.2 4 5 In Romer,
the State bent over backwards in trying to "translate" into secular
terms the message sent by the citizens of Colorado. Plausibly, the
translated version of "I object to civil rights protections for homosexuals because for religious reasons I disapprove of who they are
or what they do" is "we should respect freedom of association and
religion by not granting protected status to persons whose conduct
or orientation offends a large number of people in this community."24 6 The Court in Romer, however, would have none of the
translated version and insisted on looking for the "real version."
In short, "actual purpose" review belies the suggestion that, at
least for constitutional purposes, "translation" can sufficiently
purge a religious viewpoint on an issue of public policy from its
offense to liberal democracy.
At a very minimum, the actual basis standard requires the
religious citizen to persuade citizens with secular persuasions to
join her position if she is to have any legitimate voice in public
policy debate.2 4 7 If she speaks on her own, without the actual
backing of independent secular voices, and succeeds in implementing her views through law, her victory will be held unconsti243. 472 U.S. at 56, citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 456 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
244. Id. at 56-61.
245. Particularly as expressed in Justices Stevens and Blackmuns's concurring
or dissenting positions in Bowers, Webster, and Casey, but also in the majority
opinions in the "actual purpose" cases discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 31-55.
246. Colorado gave this as one of its justifications for Amendment 2 before the
Supreme Court. See supra text accompanying note 118.
247. This assumes that under the prevailing model, a statute could be
supported by a religious purpose so long it was not the sole purpose of the
statute, which I think is at least Perry's view. See Perry, supra note 170 at 1458
n. 45 ("[B]ecause of the role that [H religious arguments inevitably play in the
political process, it is important that such arguments, no less than secular moral
arguments, be presented-so that they can be tested-in public political debate.).
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tutional whether or not the state action could conceivably be
explained in secular terms. Oddly, this standard makes the legitimacy of the religious citizen's exercise of her prerogative as a citizen contingent upon the existence of agreement with her
objectives by secularly motivated citizens. u48 If there is a persuasive justification for disenfranchising religiously motivated citizens until they find secularly motivated citizens willing to
2 49
corroborate their policy objectives, I have yet to see it.
A second reason to reject a constitutional "translation" standard is that such a requirement would essentially privilege conventional religions at the expense of less traditional religions. W.
Burlette Carter has made the following convincing point with reference to Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.:
King was indeed fortunate that he shared in common with the
founding fathers a language of religious concept of a creator that
permitted him to manipulate the secular language of reason so
that it confirmed the values in the language of his religion-and
that he had the talent to perform this translation. Would one
whose culture or religious tradition diverged to a greater degree
from that of the mainstream (or one with less talent than King) be
25 0
able to find a similar secular or religious translational hook?
Perhaps the greatest irony of the strict separation position is
that in its rush to "disestablishment" it privileges the views of the
mainstream religionists, who find a ready secular translation for

248. Professor Koppelman has observed that, to date, "efforts to translate
religious objections to homsexual conduct into secular terms have been ... a
conspicuous failure." Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BIL
RTs. J. 89, 130 (1997). From this observation, he concludes that "laws
discriminating against gays" simply may be doomed to perpetual constitutional
failure for want of any purpose permitted by the Establishment Clause. Id.
249. I am not arguing here against the radically anti-religious participation
position that would deny to religion any voice in political affairs, see, e.g.,
Sullivan, supra note 223 at 222 (arguing that establishment principle requires
"the banishment of religion from the public square"), which seems to me more
logically coherent than the "actual basis" standard which would allow state
action to rest in part, but not entirely, on religious considerations.
250. W. Burlette Carter, Can This Culture be Saved? Another Affirmative
Action Baby Reflects on Religious Freedom, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 522 n. 107
(1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How
AMERICAN LAw AND POLITICs TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION, (1993)).
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their views, 251 over those of religious newcomers. This smacks
more of establishment than of disestablishment.
Third, the insistence on translation has the effect of forcing
many religious citizens either to cover up the real nature of their
political positions or to withdraw from participation in politics
altogether. Professor Greenawalt insists that the translation proposal does not "endorse dishonesty and concealment" because "no
one expects legislators to reveal all their grounds for decision."2 5 2
But in the area of religion, the Supreme Court rarely takes the
state at its word when it insists that a particular policy initiative
rests upon a secular justification despite its coincidence with religious dogma. The very function of actual basis review is to ferret
out "the real story." Confronted with the prospect of having even
the "translated" version declared unconstitutional if the "translating" is too thin, the religious citizen or legislator faces a strong
incentive to conceal the real basis of her vote. Far from encouraging open presentation of competing viewpoints in the public
forum, the translation position encourages a cover-up of the legislator or citizen's real motivation.
Admittedly, neither the "strict separationist" nor the "bare
animosity as applied to religion" principle necessarily has the
effect of totally disenfranchising the religious citizen, insofar as
she remains free to express her non-religious views on political
issues. For example, a committed Roman Catholic might support
a measure to increase the capital gains tax out of an economic
commitment to a balanced budget without ever considering the
religious implications of the issue. 25 3 Therefore, the disenfranchisement effect may only extend to those facets of the citi251. Probably because historically the views of their religious traditions
shaped the dominant institutions and values, which are no longer recognized as
being religiously informed, as was the case in McGowan and Gallagher.
252. Greenawalt, supra note 238 at 639.
253. On the other hand, one might argue that even this Catholic citizen's

values regarding the national deficit arise from her religiously informed beliefs
regarding the virtues of frugality and stewardship, and therefore that her

economic beliefs are merely an offshoot of her religious beliefs. For a thoughtful
person whose foundational world view is entirely religious, it is probably true
that her views on specific political issues owe their existence to a comprehensive
(and, in Rawlsian terms, non-overlapping) and therefore politically inadmissible
understanding of reality. However, the presumptive consensus seems to be that
the separation of the ultimate political view from the base religious conception by
sufficient layers of reasoning informed by non-religious influences, such as
experience or logic, sufficiently dilutes the religious character of the resulting

view to make it "non-religious" for constitutional purposes.
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zen's political beliefs that she cannot divorce from her
comprehensive religious worldview. This is of little comfort to
anyone seriously concerned with equality of citizenship. The disenfranchising effect, whether partial or total, runs contrary to the
inclusivity aspiration of liberal democracy.
A second response to my disenfranchisement model would
admit my characterization of the strict separationist position and
simply argue that the Establishment Clause itself requires this
outcome, or that it is the necessary consequence of living in a lib2 4
eral democracy dedicated to the disestablishment of religion. 1
On a jurisprudential level, I would posit that in historical context
the Establishment Clause cannot be read to preclude religious
participation in the formation of public policy without seriously
undermining the test oaths clause of Article VI.2 5 5 More fundamentally, I would deny both that the hard separationist position
has any mooring in the original meaning of the Establishment
Clause and that the bare animosity position (as applied to religiously motivated state action) has any mooring in the original
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. In this article, however,
I have not engaged the constitutional issues on a historical level,
but rather on a theoretical level. In keeping with this structure, I
will respond to this final critique on its own terms. In this article's
final subsection, I argue that the underlying philosophy of the
strict separationist and bare animosity (as applied to religion)
positions support (or at least do not preclude) a "defensive rights"
model which would permit religious considerations in the formation of public policy under certain limited circumstances.

understanding would totally prohibit any religious person from ever taking part
in public affairs, a proposition I have not yet heard advocated.
254. See Sullivan, supra note 223 at 199 ("Secular governance of public affairs
is simply an entailment of the settlement by the Establishment Clause of the war
of all sects against all.").
255. The test oaths clause provides that "no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States." U.S. Const. Art. VI, para. 3. For a discussion of the background to the
test oaths clause, see Laura Underkeiffer-Freund, The Separation of the
Religious and the Secular:A FoundationalChallenge to FirstAmendent Theory,
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 925-29 (1995);Gerald V. Bradley, The No Religious
Test Clause and the Constitutionof Religious Liberty: A Machine that Has Gone
of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674 (1987).
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B. A Modest Proposalfor Defensive Rights
The preceding sections have painted the "hard separationist"
and "bare animosity as applied to religious motivations" positions
according to what I perceive to be their philosophical bases. I
have suggested that the hard separationist position, which would
invalidate any state action that in fact rests upon a religiously
informed view of morality, correlates closely with the Enlightenment suspicion of "religious intolerance" as embodied in Rousseau's Social Contract. I have further suggested that the bare
animosity position exemplied by Romer embodies the Rawlsian
strand of Enlightenment thinking that insists that state action
rest upon a legitimate "public reason," and that the domain of
"public reason," as implicitly understood by the Supreme Court,
excludes religion. In the preceding subsection, I argued that the
convergence in constitutional doctrine of these twin principles
unjustifiably disenfranchises religious citizens. Despite my criticisms of these principles, I have not yet offered any comprehensive
solution to the problem, nor do I propose to do so in this final subsection. Rather, I will argue that by their very own logic neither
the bare animosity nor the hard separationist position can be consistently applied to exclude religiously motivated advocacy of a
certain set of political proposals-those proposals advancing what
I will describe as "defensive rights."
First, some definition. By "defensive rights" I mean those
legally enforceable immunities held by individuals which they
may assert to prevent others from using the coercive power of the
state to diminish the liberties that they would have enjoyed,
absent the contrary state action. Some immediate questions present themselves. What baseline does this model invoke? What is
meant by immunities? Why should "defensive rights" be privileged in a constructivist world? Why should religious considerations be admissible in the debate over defensive rights but not on
other issues? I will attempt to answer some of these questions in
developing the model.
The distinction between positive and negative rights is a
familiar one in constitutional discourse, though not one without
substantial ambiguities and controversies.2 5 6 We generally
256. For criticisms of the negative/positive rights dichotomy, see CAss
SUNSTEiN, THE PARTL4L CONSTITUTION 69-71 (1993); Susan Bundes, The Negative
Constitution:A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990); Mark Tushnet, An Essay
on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1392-94 (1984).
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understand the prohibitions of the Bill of Rights to be defensive
because they merely prevent the state from depriving people of
certain things rather than requiring the state to grant them entitlements.2 5 7 The positive/negative divide, however, does not suffice when describing the legitimacy of motivation in the advocacy
of public policy positions. A third category requires our attention.
The negative and positive categories are usually discussed in the
context of individual rights, as in "what can the state do to me"
and "what can I demand of the state?" This formulation, though
helpful, fails to account for the advocacy of actions by the state
that impose disabilities on others. When a speaker advocates the
criminalization of marijuana use or the prohibition of employment
discrimination she seeks to justify the intrusion of the state upon
someone else's freedom of action (and, of course, her own).
Although she may frame her argument in terms of her own rights;
i.e. "I have the right to live in a society free from the negative
externalities of drug use," or "I have the right to work free from
discrimination," she uses the term "right" differently than it is
understood in the Enlightenment paradigm of which our Constitution is one manifestation.2 5 She does not ask that the government keep from imposing on her (or others) a disability or grant
her (or others) some entitlement, but that the government exercise its coercive power to prohibit certain conduct. A traditional
rights-based argument would be the response to her proposal that
"I have the right to smoke marijuana" or that "I have the right to
choose whom to hire on whatever basis I please." Advocacy of public policy positions, then, can take three distinct forms: it can
257. See, generally, David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional
CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110
(1978); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs. 489 U.S.
189 (1989) (holding that state did not deprive boy of due process of law by failing
to remove him from the custody of his abusive father because state had no
affirmative duty to protect).
258. The natural rights theory of the Enlightenment generally conceived of
rights as negative prohibitions on actions by others. See IAN SHiPmo, THE
EVOLUTION OF RiGHTs IN LIBERAL THEORY 147 (1986). This is not to say that the
Enlightenment tradition understood rights as only extending to limitations on
conduct by the sovereign, because it also understood rights as prohibiting one
person to do certain things to another. However, the argument that the state
take X action to prevent person Y from invading the rights of person Z is not
precisely an argument based on natural rights. While Z may have a natural
right to be free from harm from person Y, he does not have a natural right to
demand that the state do anything, since the state is not a natural being, but
rather a creature of social contract.

Rights, 53 U. CH. L. REV. 864 (1986);
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argue (a) that certain
benefits be conferred or not be conferred on
certain persons, 2 59 (b) that certain disabilities be imposed on certain persons, or (c) that certain disabilities not be imposed on certain persons.2 60 This third category can be conceived either as the
(negative) argument against (b) or the (positive) argument in
favor of erecting a structural injunction against (b) if (b) should
ever be proposed or attempted. I refer to advocacy of this third
position, whether expressed as immediate opposition to a proposal
of (b) or as a structural injunction against future action, as the
advocacy of "defensive rights."
Of course, the very phrase "defensive rights" "necessarily
rest[s] on our culturally based understanding of institutional
boundaries."2 61 A social constructivist might argue that any
model beginning with the assumption that certain rights are
merely defensive in nature contains an implicit normative and
socially constructed baseline which is in no sense neutral or "natural."2 6 2 But although the baseline implicit in a defensive rights
259. This division into three categories may seem asymmetrical, because we
could subdivide the first category into two categories, for and against
entitlements, to match the discrete "for and against" disabilities categories. My
division into three categories reflects my bias in favor of using a minimal state
baseline (discussed below) under which the individual retains all liberties which
the state is not given the authority to invade. Beginning with that baseline, the
arguments in category (b) advocate extending the baseline in favor of more use of
coercive state power, those in category (c) advocate preserving the minimal state
baseline against expansive uses of state power, and those in category (a) concern
the expansion or retention of the baseline only indirectly (insofar as they touch
on the mandatory nature of taxation or the coercion implicit in allocating
benefits).
260. Obviously, these distinctions encounter some difficulty at the margin. For
example, an argument against conferring benefits may be couched in the
language of defensive rights, as in "Your use of my tax dollars, collected by the
coercive power of the state, forces me to subsidize X activity to which I object on
Y grounds." But I would reject the argument that marginal ambiguities swallow
the general rule in this instance. For the same reasons as the Supreme Court
(with the notable exception of expenditures in contravention of the
Establishment Clause; see Flast v. Cohen, 329 U.S. 83 (1968)) has refused to
permit taxpayers standing to assert generalized grievances against government
spending, Frothinghamv. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), one can rationally argue
that arguments against public expenditures are more properly characterized as
anti-entitlement than pro-defensive rights, whatever form the argument actually
takes.
261. C. Edwin Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the
Press, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819, 839 (1980)
262. Professor Sherry describes the constructivist or postmodernist view as
embodying the belief that "any standard that purports to be neutral or objective
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model reflects a normative judgment, it also reflects a descriptive
model accepted by Enlightenment thinkers whose claims about
religious participation in the formation of public policy this article
critiques. 26 3 Thus, while my defensive rights model may not
answer the claims of social constructivists, it does not need to do
so because it was developed only to demonstrate an internal flaw
in the bare animosity and strict separationist paradigms, which
are themselves products of Enlightenment thinking.
What, then, does the defensive rights model assert? In short,
it claims that neither the strict separationf"no intolerance" principle nor the bare animosity/public reason principle can legitimately
be invoked to prevent religiously motivated action by the state
creating defensive rights for individuals. In other words, a law
forbidding state actors to impose a certain kind of disability on
individuals should not be held unconstitutional merely because its
"actual purpose" is primarily or entirely religious. In application,
the defensive rights model would permit religious arguments in
favor of such public policy choices as parental rights laws, home
schooling rights, drug use liberalization laws, and constitutional
amendments erecting barriers to the expansion of anti-discrimination legislation. This last example, of course, is Romer itself, the
paradigmatic case breaking my "defensive rights" rule. But more
on Romer in a moment.
To understand why the "public reason" and "no intolerance"
principles should not be applied to the advocacy of defensive
rights, we must look back to the philosophical underpinnings of
these theories. Beginning with the "no intolerance" principle, we
said, following Rousseau, that strict separationists understand
is simply a mask for the desires of the powerful elites in society." Suzanna
Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know it Learned from the Warren
Court, 50 VAND. L. REV. 459, 482 (1997).
263. This is not to say that all Enlightenment thinkers would necessarily grant
that the baseline between negative and positive rights should be used in the
allocation of social goods and disabilities. It merely means that the
Enlightenment understanding of rights accepts a formulation of the problem
distinguishing between positive and negative rights. In A Theory of Justice,
Rawls accepts the premise that society could be ordered according to a system of
"natural liberty" where "the initial distribution is regulated by the arrangements
implicit in the conception of careers open to talents" against a backdrop of "equal
liberty" and a free market economy. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE at 72.
Although Rawls accepts the possibility of social ordering according to a system of
natural rights, he argues that such using a baseline is unjust because "it permits
distributive shares to be improperly influenced by factors arbitrary from a
moral point of view." Id.
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intolerance as the insistence that others behave the way the religious think they should behave for no better reason than that religious teachings support that behavioral norm.
Although Rousseau would have excluded the holders of even
private intolerant beliefs from civil society,2 64 we observed that in
modem translation the "intolerance" principle means only that
the religious may not coopt the coercive power of the state to force
others to conform to the standards their religious beliefs
require. 26 5 Putting aside Rousseau's outdated assumption that
the state has an interest in suppressing private intolerant
beliefs,2 6 6 the thrust of the intolerance argument goes to the evil
of religious crusading in the public arena. Again according to
Rousseau, religious intolerance threatens civil society by displacing the sovereign as sovereign even in the temporal sphere and
making the priests " the real masters, and kings [I only their
officers."2 6 7 Thus, the Enlightenment model tends to demand complete privatization of "intolerant" religious beliefs. These may be
quietly held, but not flaunted in the public arena.2 68
Nothing in the modern "no intolerance" principle suggests
that it should be universalized to prohibit private choices. To the
contrary, the very idea seems to be that religious intolerance must
be kept private. Thus, the intolerance principle provides a powerful justification for the defensive rights model, as applied to religiously motivated advocacy of public policy positions. If a citizen or
legislator makes a purely religious argument in favor of erecting
structural barriers to encroachments on her prerogative to contract, associate, or raise her children 26 9 without the constraint of
264. See supra text accompanying note 148-50.
265. Given the constraints of the First Amendment, it would be
constitutionally heretical to assert that the "no intolerance" principle requires
the government to suppress private intolerant beliefs. Given the constraints of
the state action doctrine, it would be constitutionally incorrect (even if not quite
heretical) to assert that the anti-establishment principle forbids a private person
from acting intolerantly toward another person on the basis of a religious belief.
266. I hope this assumption is outdated.
267. Rousseau, supra note 124 at 187.
268. Reflecting the dominant Enlightenment view, the Supreme Court in
Lemon remarked that religion "isa private matter for the individual, the family,
and the institutions of private choice." 403 U.S. at 625. For an excellent
discussion of "enlightened" culture's efforts to privatize religion, see McConnell,
supra note 122.
269. The education of children may not represent a pure "defensive rights"
situation because the distinct interests of the children and the parents add
dimensions to the issue. Nonetheless, I would follow Professor Gilles in viewing
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state sanction, she is not coopting the coercive power of the state
to impose her intolerant choices upon others. Rather, she is asking that the realm of free private choice be kept large and that the
authority of the state to invade that private realm be restrained.
While she may seek protection of private choices that are themselves "intolerant," the state action defending her right to make
those private choices does not impose upon others the "intolerant"
dogma, but merely permits private choices, both religiously "intolerant" and otherwise, to proceed free from state regulation. Thus,
the defensive rights model fits comfortably even with the rhetoric
of strict separation.
Similarly, the public reason principle associated with rational
basis review provides no justification for prohibiting citizens or
legislators to advocate defensive rights against the encroachment
of the state on private choices. Turning back to Rawls, we recall
that the public reason constraint arose from the fact that in "[a]
modern democratic society [ I characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines
but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive
doctrines" not all citizens affirm any single comprehensive philosophical doctrine, and it is unreasonable to believe that they will
at any time in the foreseeable future.2 7 0 Thus, when exercising its
coercive power, the state should always frame the justifications for
that exercise of power so that those subject to the coercive standard can "reasonably be expected to endorse [the justification] in
the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable
and rational." 2 71 But why should we apply the public reason constraint to arguments in favor of defensive rights? Since defensive
rights merely prevent the state from invading preexisting zones of
private choice, even if the justification for the defensive rights is
framed in terms outside the "overlapping consensus" there is no
injury to those citizens who do not endorse that comprehensive
view because the defensive rights do not require the citizen to
endorse the private choices those rights allow.
Imagine the effect of a contrary rule-that public reason
should apply even to the argument that the state not invade the
realm of private choices. Someone proposes a law to limit discrimparents as having a strong claim to direct the education of their children free
from intervention by the state. See Stephen G. Gilles, On EducatingChildren:A
ParentalistManifesto, 63 U. Cmi. L. REV. 937 (1996).
270. Rawls, supra note 169 at xviii
271. Id. at 217.
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ination in private contracting and association. 'Arguing against
the proposal, a citizen asserts that she should have the right to
continue discriminating in contracting and associating. Pressed
to give an explanation for her desire to continue discriminating,
she offers a religious justification. Should we discount her justification on the basis of the public reason principle? Surely not. To
do so would be to demand that the citizen justify her private
choices on the basis of public reason. But if the public reason principle means that citizens must explain their private choices on the
basis of public reason, we have moved from structuring a foundation upon which to build a "just and stable society of free and
equal citizens who still remain profoundly divided by reasonable
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines"2 7 2 to constructing a
"least common denominator" norm for private behavior. This is
totalitarianism, not liberal democracy.
The public reason principle cannot consistently deny citizens
the right to raise religious argument against the intrusion of the
state into their private choices. In the equal protection context,
this means that even if the state acts to restrict its future ability
to invade the realm of private rights, it may ground its decision to
do so on a purely religious basis.2 73 This brings us again to
Romer. Analyzing Romer as a religion case, this Article previously
observed that the case adheres to the following reasoning: Amendment 2 imposes a unique disability on gays, lesbians, and bi-sexuals. It therefore must satisfy rational basis review. Under this
standard, Amendment 2 must rest upon some permissible governmental purpose. We, the Court, implicitly understand that
Amendment 2 rests upon religious disapproval of homosexual conduct or status. Religious disapproval is not a legitimate "public
reason," and we therefore must discount this justification. With
religion gone, Amendment 2 has no justification, rests solely on
"bare animosity," and therefore lacks a rational basis. We could
also frame Romer as a religious intolerance case, as some have
already done.2 74 Here, we would characterize Amendment 2 as
272. Id. at 47.
273. I would concede that this may mean that the state may ground its
justification of defensive rights on purely irrational bases, such as truly naked
animosity (i.e. not even supported by extra-rational justifications), which is only
the same thing as saying that the state has no duty to prevent spiteful private
behavior.
274. See Kimball, supra note 120 at 242(describing Amendment 2 as "an
example of religious intolerance against homosexuals").
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being the product of a religious movement's success in imposing a
disability upon homosexuals simply because the religious group
disapproved of their conduct or status for religious reasons. Since
the Establishment clause forbids the imposition of disabilities for
purely religious reasons, this classification must be invalidated.
Both of these lines of analysis distort the very idea of the public reason and "no intolerance" principles. Frame the matter from
the standpoint of the religious citizen, and the matter appears
quite differently. Beginning with the baseline of the minimal
state,2 7 5 which reflects the line of demarcation between positive
and negative rights in the paradigm accepted by the Enlightenment, we would say that the individual (religious or otherwise)
has the right to contract and associate or decline to contract and
associate on whatever basis she chooses unless the state grants
another person a positive right to forbid her to contract or associate on that particular basis. Accepting the premise that there is
no state action in private choices, we need not worry that individuals will decide not to contract or associate on the basis of considerations that violate the norms of public reason or the "no
intolerance" maxim. These considerations do not apply to private
choices. At the same time, society may decide for a variety of
moral or economic reasons to impose constraints on private contracting and association. Society may freely move beyond the
baseline of the minimal state so long as it does not trench upon
zones of autonomy protected by the Constitution. But when some
members of society argue for the imposition of constraints on contracting or associating, for example anti-discrimination laws,
other members may wish to argue against such proposals and
even argue for the erection of legal barriers to the imposition of
such standards. Insofar as such arguments merely reflect a desire
to prevent the state from invading the realm of private choice,
they need not be framed in the language of public reason.
The upshot of this argument is that for purposes of the public
reason and "no intolerance" principles, Amendment 2 did not
impose a disability, but merely erected a structural barrier to the
imposition of a disability on the making of private choices. Some
will immediately object that of course Amendment 2 imposed a
275. In the traditional Enlightenment (or at least Lockean) model, the minimal
state serves only to protect against force, theft, fraud, and to enforce contracts.
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix (1974). Thus, the minimal
state serves as the line of demarcation for determining whether an action by the
state is offensive or defensive. See id. at 276.
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disability because it prevented gays, lesbians, and bi-sexuals from
seeking the sorts of anti-discrimination protection that other
groups enjoy. This response ignores my caveat that for purposes
of the public reason and "no intolerance"principles Amendment 2
did not impose a disability. Recall that the "no intolerance"
maxim focuses only on the propensity of religious crusaders to use
the coercive power of the state to require others to conform to religious norms. Amendment 2 did no such thing. Nor did it violate
the norm of public reason by asking those outside of a particular
comprehensive view to assent to that view's position on a particular issue. The amendment did not require gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to assent to a religious norm, but merely impeded them
from imposing a disability on persons wishing not to contract or
associate with gays, lesbians, and bi-sexuals. Whether or not
Amendment 2 imposed a disability in some sense, it did not do so
in any sense relevant to the public reason or "no intolerance"
norms.2 7 6 Romer's implicit assumptions were wrong. 7
To make the point even clearer, consider the following characterization of what the state must say to the individual after
Romer: "We may in the future conclude that you may you not
refuse to contract or associate on the basis of sexual orientation,
and you may not use religious argument in seeking to prevent or
repeal this prohibition on your private choices. Furthermore, if
you succeed in reversing this prohibition on your decision not to
contract or associate on certain basis, we will scrutinize your
276. As previously noted, whatever else Justice Kennedy may have said,
Romer must be understood as a discriminatory structuring of government case.
See supra note 98. But it is one thing to say that the state may not, without
compelling justification, "place special burdens on the ability of minority groups
to achieve beneficial legislation," Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458
U.S. 457, 467 (1982), and another thing altogether to say that when the very
question is whether or not the new government structure is based upon a
permissible consideration for purposes of rational basis review, religious
considerations are inadmissible because they impose "burdens" upon others to
which the others cannot be expected to assent. Whether or not the minimal state
should be considered the baseline for determining if a "discriminatory structure"
has been imposed, it should be the baseline for determining whether or not the
structure rests upon a permissible consideration. A contrary assertion cannot be
supported either by the "no intolerance" principle or the "public reason"
principle.
277. This is not to say that the Court could not have reached the same result on
some different ground, for example by holding sexual orientation to be a suspect
or quasi-suspect class requiring the state to meet the compelling interest/narrow
tailoring formulation.
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motives to determine whether you procured this reversal on the
basis of religious beliefs. If we find that you did, we will reinstate
the constraint on the set of considerations that you may refer to in
deciding whether or not to contract and associate, and punish you
if you choose not to associate or contract on the basis of an impermissible consideration." In essence, this standard permits antidiscrimination advocates to universalize their secularly informed
preferences that the religious (and others) be required to contract
or associate with gays, lesbians, and bi-sexuals when the religious
cannot universalize their religiously informed preference that
they not be required to associate or contract with gays, lesbians,
and bi-sexuals2
Underneath Romer's sweeping rhetorical prose lurks a subtle
bait-and-switch. To the modem mind, accustomed as it is to
thinking of a comprehensive anti-discrimination prohibition as
the norm and any deviation therefrom as an aberration, a referendum prohibiting the state to impose sanctions for a particular
form of discrimination may seem to be an offensive, rather than a
defensive, move. Accepting the status quo as a baseline, this may
well be. But the "no intolerance" and "public reason" positions do
not begin at the status quo. They begin in begin in comprehensive
political philosophies incorporating the Enlightenment understanding of social contract and natural liberties.27 9 They insist
that religious standards of moral behavior hold sway solely in the
private realm and not be foisted upon others through the coercive
power of the state. Romer begins where the "no intolerance" and
"public reason" principles conclude, never stopping to consider
where they came from and whether they even apply in context. In
so doing, Romer insists that public reasons be given to justify pri278. Someone may rebut this argument by suggesting that although religiously
motivated individuals could permissibly seek a legislative exemption from
generally applicable anti-discrimination statutes, Amendment 2 was overbroad
because it not only prevented the state from imposing a disability on the
religiously motivated, but it also prevented the state from imposing a disability
on non-religious citizens motivated by true "naked animosity"-i.e. irrational
hatred for homosexuals. Ironically, a narrower statutory provision, exempting
only religiously motivated discriminators, would run afoul of the Establishment
Clause as perceived by Justice Stevens, the dean of the "no intolerance" position.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, U.S. , 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (arguing that statutory exemption for religiously motivated acts from
laws of general applicability violated Establishment Clause by advantaging
religious adherents over atheists).
279. See supra note 262.
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vate choices, and that purely defensive rights satisfy the "no intolerance" specification. Using the Enlightenment suspicion of
religion as bait, the Court quietly switched the rules of the game.
Note that I am not making the full libertarian argument
against all anti-discrimination laws or other regulations on defensive private choices, as others have done.2"' The defensive rights
model does not privilege Robert Nozick's minimal state paradigm2 s ' over its chief competitor,28 2 John Rawls's difference principle,2 8 3 other than to use the minimal state as a baseline for
determining whether state action is offensive of defensive.
Rather, I suggest only that religious argument and rationale
should be admissible in our collective decision whether or not to
impose prohibitions on refusing to contract or associate for purportedly immoral reasons. As the modem regulatory state moves
farther and farther from the minimal state baseline, the realm of
genuine private choice grows smaller and smaller. To say that
religious considerations are inadmissible to erect hedges around
the realm of private choice is to take from the religious not only an
essential prerogative of their citizenship, but the most basic tool
for the defense of their moral convictions. Neither the "public reason" nor the "no intolerance" position requires a denial of the privilege to urge defensive rights for religious reasons. If the modern
state wants to be intolerant of unpopular private choices, let it say
so in explicit turns. But to couch its justification in the maxim "no
intolerance" is to create a supreme irony-public intolerance for
private prejudices based on the principle that private prejudices
cannot justify public intolerances.
CONCLUSION

With the advent of Romer, the Enlightenment project of completely privatizing religious belief finds two constitutional arrows
in its quiver. Exercises of state power that are found to rest pri280.
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281. Nozick, supra note 275 at ix. Nozick argues that moral philosophy
requires a minimal state, limited to the prevention of force, fraud, and theft and
the enforcement of contracts.
282. Alasdair MacIntyre describes Rawls and Nozick as embodying the two
basic paradigms of contemporary American political thought. ALASDAIR
MAcINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 244-46 (2d ed. 1984).
283. Rawls's difference principle requires that primary social goods be
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution would redound to the benefit
of the least advantaged in society. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE at 302-03.
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marily upon a religious motivation, and not merely to coincide
with religious beliefs, may be held to violate the "secular purpose"
prong of the much-maligned but still-kicking Lemon test. Exercises of state power disadvantaging a discrete group of people may
be said to rest upon "bare animosity" even if supported by a religiously motivated religious belief, thus failing rational basis review
under the Equal Protection Clause. The conjunction of these two
principles presents a "damned if you do, damned if you don't"
dilemma for religious citizens. Stating a religiously motivated
political view in religious terms subjects the citizen to a direct
Establishment Clause attack. Quietly voting for a proposal without explaining the vote at all subjects the citizen to a charge of
bare animosity. In essence, the Enlightenment project, as
reflected in the bare animosity and strict separationist principles,
would completely disenfranchise the religious citizen unless she
checked all of her religious "baggage" at the gate to the public
square.
I have argued in this Article that the justification for these
"strict separation" and "bare animosity" principles correlates
closely with the theories of two Enlightenment philosophers, one
early and one late. The "strict separation" principle correlates
strongly with Rousseau's proposal to exclude "intolerant" religions
from the state because of their tendency to disrupt civil peace and
to seek monopolies over political power. In modern translation,
this "no intolerance" principle means that the religious many not
coopt the coercive power of the state to impose upon others moral
standards particular to a given religion. Similarly, the "bare animosity" principle, as applied to religion correlates closely with
John Rawls's ideal of public reason, which would exclude from
public policy deliberation any consideration founded upon a comprehensive worldview. In tandem, the public reason and "no intolerance" principles provide a powerful justification for the belief
that religious considerations may not be given legal sanction to
impose esoteric moral standards upon others.
But what of the religious citizen who does not ask that the
coercive power of the state be exercised to impose her intolerant
beliefs upon others, but merely that a structural barrier be erected
so that the coercive power of the state not be exercised to restrict
her private choices in contracting or associating? Must she justify
by public reasons even her desire to remain free from government
sanction in her private choices? Do her private reasons for not
wanting to contract or associate on a particular basis become "relihttp://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol21/iss2/1
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gious intolerance" when expressed as a constitutional injunction
against anti-discrimination legislation? If the answer is yes, we
have gone from insisting that public choices rest upon non-"intolerant" public reasons to insisting that even private choices rest
upon non-"intolerant" public reasons. Perhaps there is a good
defense for this position, but if so, it has yet to be explained.
Year by year, the values of mainstream Western liberalism
move further and further from the values of traditional Western
religions. As traditional religious morality becomes less and less
palatable to mainstream culture, the assertion that the Establishment Clause prohibits religious considerations in public discourse
will resonate louder and louder. But it is supremely ironic that
the very constitutional norms that would push religious values out
of the public square under the "wall of separation" mantra would
hunt down those same religious values in the private realm as
well. Of course, an attack on the distinction between the concepts
of public and private undermines the force of this argument, but it
also undermines the "no intolerance" and "public reason" norms
that rest upon this very distinction. In the final analysis, the
legitimacy of a defensive rights model is the very least that the "no
intolerance" and "public reason" principles must concede.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999

65

